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491.
492.
Bryan R. Early 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):259-280
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region. 相似文献
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Tlohang W. Letsie 《African Security Review》2013,22(3-4):291-307
ABSTRACTThe Kingdom of Lesotho spends around five per cent of its annual budget – some 700 million Maloti ($US52.6 million) in 2017 – on the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). Lesotho’s geographical position means that the LDF has no meaningful role regarding its primary function of defending the country from external aggression and it hardly engages in its secondary functions. In addition, the LDF has a long history of interference with democratic processes and engaging in human rights abuse. The financial resources currently allocated to the LDF could do far more for security, widely defined, if they were allocated to a number of other government expenditure categories. 相似文献
495.
Chris M.A. Kwaja 《African Security Review》2013,22(2):153-161
This paper examines the rationale and centrality of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan, asking why PMSCs are involved in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan and what the principles underlying their activities are. To answer this question, the paper draws attention to the link between humanitarian crises and PMSC interventions. Where there is no meaningful alternative intervention, undergirded by humanitarian concerns that are also profit driven, PMSCs come in to provide the needed services. The protracted and complicated internal armed conflicts in Sudan, which have lasted for over two decades, have produced as many as 4,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the single largest number in the world. The kind of humanitarian assistance operations provided by PMSCs in Sudan have become critical to the provision of much-needed services which were inadequately provided by governmental authorities at both unilateral and multilateral levels. This paper argues that the humanitarian crises in Sudan created a regime that permits humanitarian assistance operations by both state and non-state actors. 相似文献
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James J. Wirtz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):333-335
498.
Erin D. Dumbacher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):203-222
ABSTRACTAn arms race in cyberspace is underway. US and Western government efforts to control this process have largely been limited to deterrence and norm development. This article examines an alternative policy option: arms control. To gauge whether arms-control models offer useful lessons for addressing cyber capabilities, this article compiles a new dataset of predominantly twentieth-century arms-control agreements. It also evaluates two case studies of negotiated agreements that regulate dual-use technologies, the 1928 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical- and biological-weapon use and the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. The analysis underscores the limits of norm development for emerging technologies with both civilian and military applications. It finds lessons for developing verifiable, international cooperation mechanisms for cyberwarfare in the regulatory model of international aviation. Conventionally, arms-control agreements take advantage of transparent tests or estimates of arms. To restrict cyberwarfare activities, experts and policy makers must adapt arms-control models to a difficult-to-measure technology at an advanced stage of development and use. Further investigation of international regulatory schemes for dual-use technology of similar diffusion and development to the internet, such as international civil aviation, is needed. 相似文献
499.
Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons. 相似文献
500.