A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, in which negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approach can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.     

The FARC’s militaristic blueprint

This article intends to explain the outstanding sequence of success and failure exhibited by the FARC, the main Colombian guerrilla since the 1980s. It claims that such sequence is unintelligible unless the adoption by the FARC of a militaristic organizational blueprint at its 1982 7^th Conference is taken into account. By building itself like an army, the FARC could boost its combat capacity, maintain its structural integrity, and develop powerful mechanisms that held the whole structure together. At the same time, the militarization of the FARC also entailed significant risks and costs like political isolation and high personnel turnover. After describing the militaristic blueprint, the article compares the FARC with other irregular forces that operated in the Colombian context – a comparison which is important to understand the specificity of the FARC trajectory, as well as the benefits and costs involved in it. The analysis highlights the critical role of organizational dimensions in the explanation of civil war outcomes, and suggests that at least for some problems organizational dynamics should be observed at a low level of granularity.     

Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.     

Sweden and the issue of NATO membership: exploring a public opinion paradox

The past decade has seen substantial shifts in Swedish security policy and major change in the domestic debate about NATO. For the first time, all of the right-of-centre “alliance parties” are calling for a full NATO membership, and popular support for NATO has increased. Yet public opinion contains ambiguities and paradoxes that complicate the picture. At the same time as support for NATO has increased, the public is overwhelmingly for continued military non-alignment. Drawing on previous research, longitudinal data from national surveys, and other sources on defence and security issues, this article aims to increase our understanding of the development and change in Swedish public opinion on NATO. A key argument is that Erving Goffman’s theatre metaphor, combined with neo-institutional decoupling theory, to a large degree can help understand the public opinion paradox.     

A O(nm log(U/n)) time maximum flow algorithm

In this paper, we present an O(nm log(U/n)) time maximum flow algorithm. If U = O(n) then this algorithm runs in O(nm) time for all values of m and n. This gives the best available running time to solve maximum flow problems satisfying U = O(n). Furthermore, for unit capacity networks the algorithm runs in O(n^2/3m) time. It is a two‐phase capacity scaling algorithm that is easy to implement and does not use complex data structures. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 511–520, 2000     

Fully sequential procedures for comparing constrained systems via simulation

We consider the problem of finding the system with the best primary performance measure among a finite number of simulated systems in the presence of a stochastic constraint on a single real‐valued secondary performance measure. Solving this problem requires the identification and removal from consideration of infeasible systems (Phase I) and of systems whose primary performance measure is dominated by that of other feasible systems (Phase II). We use indifference zones in both phases and consider two approaches, namely, carrying out Phases I and II sequentially and carrying out Phases I and II simultaneously, and we provide specific example procedures of each type. We present theoretical results guaranteeing that our approaches (general and specific, sequential and simultaneous) yield the best system with at least a prespecified probability, and we provide a portion of an extensive numerical study aimed at evaluating and comparing the performance of our approaches. The experimental results show that both new procedures are useful for constrained ranking and selection, with neither procedure showing uniform superiority over the other.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Defence budgets in the post-Cold War era: a spatial econometrics approach

This paper examines the determinants of national defence budgets in the post-Cold War era employing a spatial econometric framework. Using data for 124 countries over a 16-year time period, I examine spatial relationships in defence spending to investigate how countries account for the military spending of other countries when setting their budgets. Using specially developed weighting matrices, the regression results indicate that defence budgets are positively spatially correlated. These results provide support for the use of ‘external’ factors when examining defence budgets over this time period. The importance of a country’s spatial location when setting its budget is further examined through the identification of regions of high and low defence spending.     

The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew

Psychological warfare had been used by the French army in the Indochina War (1946–54), and had spawned a sub-caste of French officers who moulded it and counter-insurgent propaganda into a doctrine known as guerre révolutionnaire (revolutionary war). In Algeria, in 1956, the army established a specialist training centre, the CIPCG, at Arzew on the Algerian coast, to provide courses for all officers arriving ‘in country’. By this, the French command sought to ensure that field officers possessed an approach to pacification and the political dimension to their missions well suited to the terrain and socio-political make-up of Algeria. The real ‘revolutionary war’ zealots were kept away from the directing staff, although some delivered guest lectures. Despite complaints from commanders of field units at losing experienced officers to the CIPCG instructing staff, Arzew students testified that the courses aided them in their missions. Some 10,000 French officers undertook courses at the CIPCG before it was downgraded and then disbanded after Pierre Messmer, a Gaullist, became Minister for the Armed Forces in 1960.     

Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks

Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistanis are overwhelmingly opposed to American drone strikes in their country’s tribal areas and that this opposition is driven by mass media coverage of the loss of life and property the strikes purportedly cause. Using an approach based in the literature in political communication and public opinion, we argue this conventional wisdom is largely inaccurate. Instead, we contend that awareness of drone strikes will be limited because Pakistan is a poor country with low educational attainment, high rates of illiteracy and persistent infrastructure problems that limit access to mass media. Moreover, because of these same country characteristics, Pakistanis’ beliefs about drone strikes will be shaped primarily by informal, face-to-face political communication, rather than through more formal media sources. We test this argument using data that we collected by fielding a 7,656 respondent, nationally-representative survey carried out in Pakistan in 2013. The results of the statistical analysis support our arguments.