The Freudian trap in combat motivation theory

Theories of group, and individual, motivation to fight have shown little real advancement since World War II. The lively debate between the proponents of ‘primary group’ and ideological theories has tended to preclude any other analysis. The debate has continued to generalise from the experience of the Wehrmacht and its cohesion in the face of appalling destruction. In this article I suggest that the theoretical underpinnings of the debate have revolved around one particular, and somewhat unrecognised, concept of the mind. Work on combat motivation owes a substantial debt to Freudian ideas concerning the unconscious and group psychology. Both sides of the ideology/primary group debate use Freudian ideas, often without realising it, and these concepts shape the various positions taken. Only by acknowledging and examining this underpinning can the debate move forward and produce a more general theory of combat motivation and group conflict with wider application.     

FDs and Military Reform

Abstract

Ron Smith looks at procurement procedures within a European context, taking account of the problems currently facing defence industries and aduocates the institution of a European Defence Union, to be closely monitored by a joint finance Ministry to prevent overspending and monopoly.     

The United States' Use of Exiles in Promoting Regime Change in Cuba, 1961 and Iraq, 2002–3

Issues raised by the United States' relations with and potential use of Iraqi exile groups in 2003–3 bear important similarities to those surrounding the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Fidel Castro's Cuba 40?years previously. In both cases, questions of legitimacy were of prime importance. In both cases too, the role played by the US had ramifications for the effectiveness of the exiles' own roles in the political and operational spheres. Finally, in each case the exile ‘movements’ were characterised by numerous, often rancorous, internal divisions, raising questions about their capacity to effectively constitute alternative governments.     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

Requirements of an “optimizer” for computer simulations

Computer simulation has many advantages. However, one major disadvantage is that, in all too many cases, the attempt to use computer simulation to find an optimum solution to a problem rapidly degenerates into a trial-and-error process. Techniques for overcoming this disadvantage, i. e., for making optimization and computer simulation more compatible, are applicable at two points in the development of the overall computer simulation. Techniques which are used within actual construction of the mathematical models comprising the simulation will be labeled as internal methods, while those which are used after the simulation has been completely developed will be termed external methods Because external methods appear to offer the largest potential payoff, discussion is restricted to these methods, which are essentially search techniques. In addition, the development of an “Optimizer” computer program based on these techniques is suggested Although drawbacks to the use of search techniques in the computer simulation framework exist, these techniques do offer potential for “optimization.” The modification of these techniques to satisfy the requirements of an “Optimizer” is discussed.     

Forecast horizons for the discounted dynamic lot-size problem allowing speculative motive

This article considers the dynamic lot-size problem under discounting, allowing speculative motive for holding inventory. A variable rolling-horizon procedure is presented, which, under certain regularity conditions, is guaranteed to generate an infinite-horizon optimal-production plan. We also discuss a fixed rolling-horizon procedure which provides a production plan that achieves an infinite-horizon cost within a user-specified tolerance ϵ of optimality. The fixed-horizon length T* needed in this procedure is given in terms of a closed-form formula that is independent of specific forecasted demands. We also present computational results for problems with a range of cost parameters and demand characteristics.     

Factors influencing military recruitment in South Africa: the voices of Cape Town high school learners

This research sets out to establish how the youth in South Africa view military service, and what factors affect the ability of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to attract suitable recruits to staff its modern, technologically advanced military. Due to high levels of youth unemployment, South Africa has sufficient persons volunteering for military service. The problem lies with recruiting sufficient quality personnel with the right profile and abilities. To establish what affects enlistment, focus group discussions were conducted with learners from eight schools to determine what influences their career choices, what deters them from or attracts them to military service, their perception of the military profession, their knowledge of the military, and the influence of factors such as race and gender. The conclusion is reached that the SANDF is not considered an employer of choice due to poor service conditions, a decline in the prestige of the military, unfavourable aspects associated with military culture, a growing ‘knowledge gap’ and disconnect between the military and South African society, the estrangement of certain race groups, and the masculine nature of the military. These aspects need to be addressed if the SANDF wishes to attract learners with good academic credentials.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: the EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS; so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU’s strategic priority must involve stabilizing its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU’s own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.