A performance comparison of empirical Bayes and Bayes estimators of the Weibull and gamma scale parameters

A mean-squared error comparison of smooth empirical Bayes and Bayes estimators for the Weibull and gamma scale parameters is studied based on a computer simulation. The smooth empirical Bayes estimators are determined as functions of up to 15 past estimates of the parameter of interest. Results indicate that at best the mean-squared errors of the empirical Bayes estimators are about 20–40% larger than those of the corresponding squared-error optimal Bayes estimators.     

The economic effects of inspector error on attribute sampling plans

In this paper the effects of inspector error on a cost-based quality control system are investigated. The system examined is of a single sampling plan design involving several cost components. Both type I and type II inspector errors are considered. The model employs a process distribution, thus assuming that a stochastic process of some kind governs the quality of incoming lots. Optimal plan design is investigated under both error-free and error-prone inspection procedures and some comparisons are made.     

Estimation of a hidden service distribution of an M/G/∞ system

The maximum likelihood estimator of the service distribution function of an M/G/∞ service system is obtained based on output time observations. This estimator is useful when observation of the service time of each customer could introduce bias or may be impossible. The maximum likelihood estimator is compared to the estimator proposed by Mark Brown, [2]. Relative to each other, Brown's estimator is useful in light traffic while the maximum likelihood estimator is applicble in heavy trafic. Both estimators are compared to the empirical distribution function based on a sample of service times and are found to have drawbacks although each estimator may have applications in special circumstances.     

A defense allocation problem with development costs

In this paper, the mathematical model for the allocation of resources among a general mix of percentage vulnerable and of numerically vulnerable weapon systems is presented and solved. Percentage vulnerable systems consist of mobile weapons which are difficult to locate, but relatively easy to destroy once located; numerically vulnerable systems comprise easily located fixed base weapons which are difficult to destroy. The distinguishing feature of this analysis is the inclusion of development costs. The theory of max-min is extended as necessary to solve this problem. References are provided to a sequence of earlier versions of this problem.     

Johnson's approximate method for the 3 × n job shop problem

The effectiveness of Johnson's Approximate Method (JAM) for the 3 × n job shop scheduling problems was examined on 1,500 test cases with n ranging from 6 to 50 and with the processing times A_i, B_i, C_i (for item i on machines A, B, C) being uniformly and normally distributed. JAM proved to be quite effective for the case B_i ? max (A_i, C_i) and optimal for B_i, ? min (A_i, C_i).     

The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

Air Power in the Six-Day War

In the aftermath of Israel's stunning victory over Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces during the 1967 Six-Day War, accolades for the victory were often showered upon the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Indeed, many believed that it had been Israeli air power that had been the decisive element in the war by first eliminating the Arab air forces and then obliterating the Arab armies in turn. While the IAF did play an extremely important role in the fighting, it was not the decisive element of Israeli victory, and its impact was felt in very different ways from the common perception. Indeed, an appreciation of the true role of Israeli air power in the war reinforces both the importance of psychological factors in combat, and the ability of air forces to have a psychological impact disproportionate to their physical impact.     

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack

Bomboozled: How the U.S. Government Misled Itself and Its People into Believing They Could Survive a Nuclear Attack, by Susan Roy. Pointed Leaf Press, 2011. 176 pages, $45.