A specially structured nonlinear integer resource allocation problem

We present an algorithm for solving a specially structured nonlinear integer resource allocation problem. This problem was motivated by a capacity planning study done at a large Health Maintenance Organization in Texas. Specifically, we focus on a class of nonlinear resource allocation problems that involve the minimization of a convex function over one general convex constraint, a set of block diagonal convex constraints, and bounds on the integer variables. The continuous variable problem is also considered. The continuous problem is solved by taking advantage of the structure of the Karush‐Kuhn‐Tucker (KKT) conditions. This method for solving the continuous problem is then incorporated in a branch and bound algorithm to solve the integer problem. Various reoptimization results, multiplier bounding results, and heuristics are used to improve the efficiency of the algorithms. We show how the algorithms can be extended to obtain a globally optimal solution to the nonconvex version of the problem. We further show that the methods can be applied to problems in production planning and financial optimization. Extensive computational testing of the algorithms is reported for a variety of applications on continuous problems with up to 1,000,000 variables and integer problems with up to 1000 variables. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 770–792, 2003.     

美国陆军随军牧师制度发展简史

一、美国陆军随军牧师制度的早期形成与发展(一)随军牧师制度溯源如要探寻美国陆军随军牧师制度的源头,可以追溯到悠远的历史深处。每当出现骚乱、危急和恐怖的时刻,人类总是寄希望于宗教和宗教人士,以获得安慰。战争时期也不例外。在发生战争冲突的时期,无论是古代社会,还是现代社会,人们都会转而求助于宗教。公众总是期望把宗教的抚慰同样传递给那些在战场上服役的士兵们。从人们已知的有文字记载之前的社会开始,祭司和其他宗教人士或许就在为战争的胜利而祈求上帝或众神的保佑了。《旧约》中就常提及随军参战的祭司(priests)。在《摩西五…     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

The economic effects of inspector error on attribute sampling plans

In this paper the effects of inspector error on a cost-based quality control system are investigated. The system examined is of a single sampling plan design involving several cost components. Both type I and type II inspector errors are considered. The model employs a process distribution, thus assuming that a stochastic process of some kind governs the quality of incoming lots. Optimal plan design is investigated under both error-free and error-prone inspection procedures and some comparisons are made.     

Putin and Russia in retro and forward: the nuclear dimension

Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia’s status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.     

Search and the introduction of improved technologies

Modeling R&D as standard sequential search, we consider a monopolist who can implement a sequence of technological discoveries during the technology search process: he earns revenue on his installed technology while he engages in R&D to find improved technology. What is not standard is that he has a finite number of opportunities to introduce improved technology. We show that his optimal policy is characterized by thresholds ξ_i(x): introduce the newly found technology if and only if it exceeds ξ_i(x) when x is the state of the currently installed technology and i is the number of remaining introductions allowed. We also analyze a nonstationary learning‐by‐doing model in which the monopolist's experience in implementing new technologies imparts increased capability in generating new technologies. Because this nonstationary model is not in the class of monotone stopping problems, a number of surprising results hold and several seemingly obvious properties of the stationary model no longer hold. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Book reviews

John Horsfield, The Art of Leadership in War. The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. 240; £14.75.

John Joseph Timothy Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini's Army, 1920–1940. Westport, Connecticut &; London: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 207; £15.50.

Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper. Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P., 1980. Pp. 328; £8.60.

Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pp. 425; $15.00.

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government and its Discontents. New York: Basic Books, and London: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 202; £7.95.

Seweryn Bialer (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1981. Pp. 441; £14.95.

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. 175; £12.00 (hb.) and £3.95 (pb.)

Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968–1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980. Pp. 967; £39.95.

Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–47; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980. Pp. 254; £14.50;

Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab‐Israeli Conflict; Psychological Obstacles to Peace. Oslo: Universittsforlaget, 1979. Pp. 234; £11.60;

Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision‐making; Israel's Security Choices 1967. Columbus. Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 1980. Pp. 399; $35.     

The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations

Abstract

Will China's development of a new generation of nuclear weapons impact US-China security relations in important ways? One's answer depends on how one views the following: whether or not Chinese leaders believe that they are only now acquiring a secure second strike capability; the scope of coercive power that secure second strike capability provides to conventionally inferior actors; the meaning of China's ‘No First Use’ Doctrine; and the prospects for escalation control in future crises. Applying Cold War theories and tapping Chinese doctrinal writings this article concludes that China's nuclear modernization program might prove more consequential than is commonly believed.