A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

The case for Azawad

Since Mali achieved independence from France, the marginalised Tuareg population of Mali has sought independence and the right to form their own nation, ‘Azawad’. These efforts have continuously been frustrated by the Tuaregs' neighbours, due to competing nationalist pride and interests in the mineral resources believed to lie under the northern Malian soil. Thus far, the Tuaregs of northern Mali have been largely neglected and denied both inclusive and effective governance by the various Malian governments from the southern Malian capital of Bamako. When negotiations have failed, Tuareg attempts to seize their own independence through violence have been brutally crushed by the Malian government. The Malian government will neither advance the interests of the Tuaregs nor allow them the freedom to pursue their own path in the world. The advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya provided another opportunity for the Tuaregs to pursue their dreams of an independent Azawad. Tuareg fighters returning from Libya carried with them both considerable combat experience and stockpiles of arms that they used to temporarily free their homeland. Unfortunately, the Tuaregs' whirlwind conquest of northern Mali was undone by the emergence of a new transnational threat in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) supplanted the previously victorious Tuaregs and attempted to turn Azawad into a Taliban-esque caliphate. French intervention defeated AQIM, but set the stage for a continuation of the cycle of violence and instability borne from the unwillingness of the international community to support the Tuaregs' legitimate right to self-determination.     

多孔陶瓷膜双向过滤阻力试验分析

为研究多孔陶瓷膜过滤阻力,提出了多孔陶瓷膜双向过滤方式,分析了9通道多孔陶瓷膜在双向过滤时的有效过滤面积和通道截面积,建立了过滤阻力关系式。试验结果表明,跨膜压差0.05～0.10 MPa、错流速度1.8 m/s时,浓差极化阻力Rp为主要过滤阻力;跨膜压差0.10～0.25 MPa、错流速度1.0～2.2 m/s时,吸附沉积阻力Rd为主要过滤阻力;跨膜压差0.15 MPa、错流速度2.2～3.0 m/s时,膜自身阻力Rm是主要过滤阻力;增大错流速度能够有效延缓浓差极化的发生,减小吸附沉积层的厚度,减轻膜污染,延长过滤周期。     

What determines military allocations in Africa: Theoretical and empirical investigations

This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the determinants of military spending in Africa. It specifies a formal model and uses time‐series and cross‐sectional estimations to ascertain the reasons behind variations in military allocations across and within 40 African countries during 1960–1991. The differences in military expenditures appear to reflect a complex of economic, political, and strategic factors at both national and international levels. Strategic considerations are, however, found to be the most important factors in most African countries.     

The rising unit cost of defence equipment — The reasons and the results

This paper constructs a conceptual model for the selection of defence equipment providing best value for money. It then shows how the unit cost of the chosen equipment increases between one generation of equipment and its successor because of developments in the perceived threat, the available technology and industrial productivity, and demonstrates that unit cost increases can arise from a logical and rational procurement policy and are not necessarily caused by technological chimeras and military vainglory. The resulting persistent rise in unit cost is unlikely to be significantly slowed by any of the counter‐measures yet proposed.

The paper then discusses the policies which nations have adopted to accommodate past increases in unit cost, and the options which confront any nation at the point when it can no longer afford to re‐equip a particular element of its armed forces.     

Prices and quantities in the arms trade*

There are two main sources of information about the Arms Trade, SIPRI and ACDA. These two sources give very different pictures of the evolution of the market, primarily because their measures are designed to capture conceptually different features. Although they are both expressed in constant dollars, the SIPRI series is designed to be a volume index of physical transfers, the ACDA series a constant price value index. Thus in principle, the ratio of the ACDA to SIPRI series should provide an implicit price index of arms; though in practice there are many measurement problems. In this paper, we discuss the basis of these indices and show that the ratio, the implicit price, not only looks plausible in the light of the evolution of the market, but has a significant negative effect on the demand for arms imports in an econometric equation.     

Life cycle costs for decision support ‐ a study of the various life cycle costs used at different levels of defence policy and management∗

Debates on many aspects of defence economics ‐ on the scale of defence expenditure, on the allocation of that expenditure to various military capabilities, and on the selection of equipment offering the best value for money ‐ are bedevilled by misunderstandings and misconceptions about the costs of defence equipment. This paper seeks to improve understanding of defence equipment costs by defining a hierarchy of defence equipment within which the direct and indirect life cycle costs of defence equipment may be allocated at different levels. Having reviewed the direct and indirect components of the life cycle cost, this paper then shows how different costing studies for different purposes require different approaches to life cycle costing, and that there is no unique life cycle cost which can be assigned to one particular item of defence equipment. There is instead a range oflife cycle costs, each of which is appropriate for a particular study, and it is important that a quoted cost of an item of defence equipment should be used only in the pertinent circumstances. The paper is written from a UK perspective and accordingly uses British nomenclature, but its principles should be relevant to defence cost studies in other nations.     

一类微分方程Poincaré分岔极限环的不存在性

利用一阶Mel'nikov函数讨论了一类广义Liénard方程Poincaré分岔极限环的不存在性,得出了若干充分条件.