‘Outside their expertise’: The implications of Field Manual 3-24 for the professional military education of non-commissioned officers

Within the framework of classical theory, the joint US Army-Marine field manual Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) described an ambitious set of skills required for success against guerrillas. But if counterinsurgency, as FM 3-24 describes it, is ‘the graduate level of warfare’, then these two military services have been for years systematically failing to train their talent in the appropriate fields. In today's small wars, NCOs serve as modern-day Mounties, and consequently require at least a modest undergraduate education in armed good governance.     

Poachers turned gamekeepers: A study of the guerrilla phenomenon in Spain, 1808–1840

This article modifies the associations made by historians and political scientists of Spanish guerrilla warfare with revolutionary insurgency. First, it explains how the guerrilla phenomenon moved from a Leftist to a reactionary symbol. Second, it compares the insurgency and counter-insurgency features of the Carlist War (1833–1840) with those of the better-known Peninsular War (1808–1814). Third, it shows how erstwhile guerrilla leaders during the Carlist War made their expertise available to the counter-insurgency, in a socio-economic as well as military setting. This article revises the social banditry paradigm in nineteenth-century Spain in the under-researched context of Europe bloodiest nineteenth-century civil war.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOW NUCLEAR NUMBERS

President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of US nuclear weapons. Much attention has been paid to the US-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides. But considerably less attention has been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the reactions of both adversaries and US allies. If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to accompany nuclear cuts. But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary. This article summarizes the results of a multi-author study. It concludes that regions with US allies and formal extended deterrence pledges may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or commitments.     

Inequality‐based reliability estimates for complex systems

Full‐system testing for large‐scale systems is often infeasible or very costly. Thus, when estimating system reliability, it is desirable to use a method that uses subsystem tests, which are often less expensive and more feasible. This article presents a method for bounding full‐system reliabilities based on subsystem tests and, if available, full‐system tests. The method does not require that subsystems be independent. It accounts for dependencies through the use of certain probability inequalities. The inequalities provide the basis for valid reliability calculations while not requiring independent subsystems or full‐system tests. The inequalities allow for test information on pairwise subsystem failure modes to be incorporated, thereby improving the bound on system reliability. We illustrate some of the properties of the estimates via an example application. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation

The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents.     

Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940

The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper analyzes the use of information and intelligence of both sides at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Both sides performed poorly at the strategic level but the Germans proved far superior to the British at the operational and tactical levels. The paper challenges several common assumptions on the importance of intelligence and information in joint campaigns.