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141.
Danielle Peterson Richard S. Goorevich Rich Hooper Lawrence Scheinman James W. Tape 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):515-527
Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities. 相似文献
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Irvin R. Lindemuth 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):483-507
Post-Cold War “lab-to-lab” collaborations on unclassified scientific issues between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories set the stage for bilateral cooperation in materials control and other nuclear areas. They also became the major element in a cooperative process initiated by a Presidential Decision Directive to ensure Russia's compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. These collaborations have always been highly favored by leaders of the Russian nuclear weapons complex—the same leaders who oversee Russia's participation in various government-to-government programs. This article reviews these collaborations and examines the possibility that U.S. rebuffs of Russian proposals and the U.S. failure to keep promises of expanded collaboration could contribute to Russia's reluctance in major programs and even lead to a return to nuclear testing by Russia. The author argues that a renewed U.S. commitment to the process should be an immediate goal of the Obama administration and is an essential step in re-engaging Russia to solve the nuclear problems remaining from the Cold War. Steps for doing so are recommended. 相似文献
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Michael Barletta Clay Bowen Kimber Cramer R. Adam Moody 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):132-145
The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according o the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place. 相似文献
147.
Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Dr Peter R. Neumann 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):571-595
This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power. 相似文献
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Thomas R. Mockaitis 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):132-133
Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention.New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. Pp.xviii + 499, maps, tables, notes, biobliog., index. NP. ISBN 1–56324–308–3. 相似文献
150.
In Chechnya a protracted conflict only seemingly quieted down, but it still smolders and as the conflict is suppressed by coercion, it is inevitable that it will flare up at some time in the near future. The root causes of the conflict can be understood by use of globalization theory, which dialectically brings together the clashing forces from above and below. Civil society in Chechnya deteriorated, is politically curtailed, and has no resilience left. It thus results in a frozen conflict and an excluded and victimized society. Russian-style reconstruction does alleviate living conditions, but does not remediate the frozen conflict character of the present situation. The dynamics of the globalizing forces from below and above, summarized in the glocalization concept, not only explains the resistance by the Chechen people, for whom revolt, rebellion, and terrorism remain attractive options, but also serves as a model for other insurgencies. Reflecting on the two recent Chechen–Russian wars results in a paradigmatic case study. 相似文献