The burglar problem with multiple options

We consider the burglar problem in which a burglar can either retire or choose among different types of burglaries, with each type having its own success probability and reward distribution. Some general structural results are established and, in the case of exponentially distributed reward distributions, a solution technique is presented. The burglar problem's relationship to a stochastic knapsack problem with a random exponentially distributed knapsack capacity is shown. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 359–364, 2014     

THO-MAC:一种两跳优化的低延迟低功耗无线传感器网络介质访问控制协议

功耗与延迟是无线传感器网络介质访问控制协议设计首要考虑的两个问题。提出了一种新的传感器网络低延迟、低功耗、接收节点初始化异步介质访问控制协议——THO-MAC协议。通过准确预测接收节点的唤醒时间,THO-MAC协议调度发送节点侦听信道,从而减少发送节点空闲侦听能量浪费。THOMAC协议在发送节点两跳转发节点集中选择使报文两跳转发延迟最小的转发节点,从而降低报文传输延迟。使用NS2模拟器对THO-MAC协议进行了详细模拟。模拟结果显示,与RI-MAC和Any-MAC协议相比,THOMAC协议可以减少35.5%和18%的报文传输延迟,同时节省23.5%和15.5%的节点功耗。     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014     

不确定数据流多维建模方法*

由于不确定数据流应用的出现,给传统的精确、静态数据环境下的多维建模带来了巨大挑战。针对不确定数据流动态、无限和不确定等特征,提出了一种不确定数据流多维模型。该模型中引入了不确定对象来描述不确定事实元组,并且通过定义时间维度的层次时间窗口,很好地反映了数据流的动态性和无限性,最后还对此多维不确定数据流模型的基本代数操作和分析代数操作进行了形式化定义,为不确定数据流多维查询与分析提供了理论依据。     

A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPLY

Hatzinikolaou raises a number of issues related mainly to the econometrics of our paper. These issues are categorized according to the three stages of econometric analysis: specification, estimation, and diagnostic checking. We categorize our reply to his comments accordingly.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.