A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975

Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo–Omani offensives conventionally.     

Fighting on Their Own Terms: The Tactics of the Irish Republican Army 1919-1921

Abstract

The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.     

International armaments collaboration and the limits of reform

Budgetary pressures have driven a steady expansion of armaments collaboration projects internationally. This has also been the case in Europe where it is estimated that currently one-fifth of European procurement budgets are spent on collaborative weapons systems and the European Defence Agency has the long-term objective of increasing this figure by over 50%. The purpose of this article is to assess whether collaborative armaments projects can offer the benefits frequently attributed to them. To this end, the study examines the five combat aircraft projects that European states have collaboratively undertaken since the 1950s.     

One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

UNFPA and population assistance

International population assistance in the UN is a relatively recent development; it is only since 1966 that a broad-based technical assistance program in population was authorized by the General Assembly. The desire of developing country members for accelerated economic growth ultimately brought about a change in the views on population. In 1967, the Secretary General established a trust fund for population activities, later renamed the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). 3 principles have guided UNFPA work since its inception: 1) national sovereignty in population matters is to be resspected and adhered to at all times, 2) individuals and couples are to be provided the information and services necessary to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, and 3) population goals and policies are integral parts of socioeconomic defelopment. The areas of assistance by the UNFPA consist of 1) family planning, 2) communication and education, 3) population dynamics, 4) basic data collection, 5) population policy formulation and implementation, and 6) special programs such as those for women and the aging population. In 16 years, the UNFPA has received about $1.4 billion for transfer to developing countries as population assistanceand has financed 4373 population projects in 149 countries and territories. The relation between the US government and UNFPA is tenuous and likely to remain so as long as the US cannot resolve its own domestic controversies over famly planning, foreign population assistance, abortion, which, ironically, is legalin the country. There will always be some sort of domestic controversy over population; the UN has overcome domestic difficulties by framing the arguments properly within the demographic, social, economic, ecological, and political concerns of countries and applying the fundamental principles of national sovereignty, freedom of individual choice, and the link of population and development,to reconcile differences.