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891.
Christopher M. Faulkner Joshua E. Lambert Jonathan M. Powell 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):641-659
ABSTRACTThis paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination. 相似文献
892.
Dennis M. Gormley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):123-139
ABSTRACTThe dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. 相似文献
893.
894.
Ross A. Kennedy 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(7):1058-1070
The books under review here, by Robert F. Hannigan, John A. Thompson, Trygve Throntveit, and Adam Tooze, offer an interpretation of Wilsonian internationalism and what happened to it in the 1920s. For Tooze and Hannigan, Wilsonianism was primarily a project to attain American predominance in the world. For Throntveit, Wilsonian internationalism constituted a pragmatic yet radical effort to end competitive power politics. Thompson disagrees with these arguments and asserts that the key to understanding US policy lay in how US leaders conceptualized American power. Thompson’s interpretation is especially compelling in explaining why the United States failed to engage itself more assertively in international affairs in the 1920s – a failure Tooze suggests undermined the viability of the postwar international system. 相似文献
895.
Nicholas A Lambert 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):272-297
The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution. 相似文献
896.
Many authors contend that ethnic extremism coupled with political manipulation were the primary factors behind the Rwandan genocide. Yet, to oversimplify the cause of this tragedy makes one blind to the complicated nexus that generated the outcome. Even though this genocide was quick in its execution, the events that lead to this massacre took years to unfold. We argue that the evolution of human capital and the competition for scarce resources contributed to the genocide. 相似文献
897.
Sean M. Maloney 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):27-44
Analytical focus on military operations in Iraq continue to overshadow analysis of the war in Afghanistan as it enters its sixth year. It is now possible to discern several clearly-delineated periods of coalition counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. What is the nature of the war and how has it evolved? Has there been success so far in Afghanistan? 相似文献
898.
A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles. 相似文献
899.
David A. Patten 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):879-906
Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo. 相似文献
900.