全文获取类型
收费全文 | 867篇 |
免费 | 21篇 |
出版年
2021年 | 13篇 |
2019年 | 28篇 |
2018年 | 22篇 |
2017年 | 20篇 |
2016年 | 21篇 |
2015年 | 19篇 |
2014年 | 14篇 |
2013年 | 190篇 |
2011年 | 8篇 |
2009年 | 12篇 |
2008年 | 11篇 |
2007年 | 9篇 |
2006年 | 10篇 |
2005年 | 19篇 |
2004年 | 17篇 |
2003年 | 12篇 |
2002年 | 9篇 |
2000年 | 9篇 |
1999年 | 8篇 |
1998年 | 11篇 |
1997年 | 18篇 |
1996年 | 16篇 |
1995年 | 9篇 |
1994年 | 19篇 |
1993年 | 7篇 |
1992年 | 11篇 |
1991年 | 26篇 |
1989年 | 15篇 |
1988年 | 12篇 |
1987年 | 23篇 |
1986年 | 15篇 |
1985年 | 19篇 |
1984年 | 11篇 |
1983年 | 10篇 |
1982年 | 10篇 |
1980年 | 11篇 |
1979年 | 14篇 |
1978年 | 10篇 |
1977年 | 14篇 |
1976年 | 12篇 |
1975年 | 8篇 |
1974年 | 13篇 |
1973年 | 15篇 |
1972年 | 15篇 |
1971年 | 11篇 |
1970年 | 14篇 |
1969年 | 11篇 |
1968年 | 9篇 |
1967年 | 10篇 |
1966年 | 7篇 |
排序方式: 共有888条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
781.
782.
Abstract What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure. 相似文献
783.
Steven E. Lobell 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):747-773
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet. 相似文献
784.
785.
This study examines the problems of paramilitary decommissioning in Northern Ireland. It analyses why decommissioning has become so contentious in the Northern Ireland peace process. Decommissioning, though, is not a unique or intrinsically insurmountable problem. This is demonstrated by highlighting the issue in international context. Three examples of decommissioning in conflict resolution processes are assessed: the Lebanon, El Salvador and Mozambique. These varied examples do supply some limited lessons for Northern Ireland. This study argues that the explanation for the intractability of decommissioning in Northern Ireland resides, to a greater extent, in the tactical and strategic reasoning of the main paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland. The factors that condition their thinking, however, can be found in the nature of the peace process itself which provides the paramilitiaries with every incentive to retain possession of their weapons. 相似文献
786.
787.
Jacques E. C. Hymans 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(5):769-797
Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential. 相似文献
788.
789.
Edward M. Spiers 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):94-112
John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U Boat Wars 1916 ‐1945. London: Leo Cooper, 1989. Pp.xx + 841; £19.50. Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Armies: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xvi + 359; index; illustrations. £37.50 (hardback). Keith Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989. Pp.xiv + 188; £35. Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Pp.xii + 244; £12.95. Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson (eds.), Limits to Soviet Power. Lexington, MA/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989. Pp.vii + 231; $35. Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South‐East Asia. London and New York: Routledge, 1989. Pp.x + 198; £30. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter‐measures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edn. 1989. Pp.xv + 248; £27.50 (hardback); £10.95 (paperback). John F. Murphy, Punishing International Terrorists: The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives. Totowa, NJ: Rowman &; Allanheld 1985. Pp.x + 142; $25.95. Hanns Maull and Otto Pick (eds.), The Gulf War. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.193; £30. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1989. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989. Pp.xxviii + 361; £35. Virginia Gamba‐Stonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. Pp.xiii + 155; £30. Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front. London: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989. Pp.194; £25. Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1989. Pp.183; £19.50. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. University Press of America, 1988. Pp.xiv + 347; $16.75 (paperback). (First Published, 1962). 相似文献
790.
Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it. 相似文献