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241.
Michael Evans 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):175-195
This article examines the vital importance of political ideology in formulating effective counterinsurgency, by examining the case of Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. During this period, the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government of Ian Smith adopted a radical right-wing ‘world-struggle ideology’ to justify settler resistance to African decolonisation. The RF's ideology, based on settler-status anxiety, upheld a conspiratorial interpretation of modern politics that emphasised virulent forms of Anglophobia, anti-communism, anti-internationalism and anti-liberalism. The Smith Government portrayed African nationalism not as an indigenous political phenomenon, but as an external instrument of world communism and Western appeasement. After 1972, when Rhodesia faced a protracted insurgency, many of the principles of RF ideology were applied to counterinsurgency warfare with disastrous results. Because the Rhodesian Government viewed African guerrilla warfare as unrelated to domestic politics, Rhodesian counterinsurgency lacked a realistic political dimension. The dictates of settler ideology blinded the Rhodesian Government to the vital need to win ‘hearts and minds’ by applying timely principles of political pacification and reform to its counterinsurgency effort. Instead a Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign proved counter-productive accelerating strategic deterioration and leading ultimately to the political victory of the African guerrilla cause in 1980. 相似文献
242.
Ethan M. Orwin 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):330-351
From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict. 相似文献
243.
M. Amarjeet Singh 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):795-812
Soon after India attained its independence from British colonial administration in 1947 the Nagas started waging an armed conflict against India to establish a sovereign independent state in Nagaland in the country's Northeast region. The conflict is today one of the world's longer running and little known armed conflicts. India's central government has tried unsuccessfully to tackle the problem through political reconciliation, use of force, and several development measures. Over the years, it has also undergone several changes in which the situation of conflict deepened whenever India's central government intervened. And yet, the road ahead also faces severe challenges because the demand for bringing the Nagas of India together into a single political entity will not go unchallenged from other ethnic groups. Moreover, a bitter leadership battle divides the Naga rebels and hence any future agreement is likely to be difficult due to factional politics as have happened in the past. Thus one way to satisfy the aspirations of different ethnic groups while protecting the boundaries of the existing states in India is to explore the option of cultural autonomy. This idea is not entirely new, but has lost significance over the years. 相似文献
244.
Riley M. Moore 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):857-878
As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’ 相似文献
245.
Kenneth M Pollack Dr 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(3):471-503
In the aftermath of Israel's stunning victory over Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces during the 1967 Six-Day War, accolades for the victory were often showered upon the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Indeed, many believed that it had been Israeli air power that had been the decisive element in the war by first eliminating the Arab air forces and then obliterating the Arab armies in turn. While the IAF did play an extremely important role in the fighting, it was not the decisive element of Israeli victory, and its impact was felt in very different ways from the common perception. Indeed, an appreciation of the true role of Israeli air power in the war reinforces both the importance of psychological factors in combat, and the ability of air forces to have a psychological impact disproportionate to their physical impact. 相似文献
246.
James M. Acton 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):141-154
ABSTRACTRussian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon. 相似文献
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249.
The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance. 相似文献
250.