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151.
James J. Wirtz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):333-335
152.
Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality. 相似文献
153.
Harald Müller 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):545-565
In two landmark articles, longtime scholars Kenneth N. Waltz and Thomas C. Schelling have re-emphasized the utility of nuclear deterrence over nuclear nonproliferation (Waltz) and nuclear disarmament (Schelling). While the thrust of the articles is seemingly different, both are rooted in the same intellectual ground: an epistemology that assumes problem-free inferences, drawn from past experiences, are applicable in future scenarios; a foundational rooting in strategic rationality that entangles them in unsolvable contradictions concerning comparable risks of different nuclear constellations, namely deterrence versus proliferation and disarmament; and a bias in framing the empirical record that makes nuclear deterrence more conducive to security than nuclear disarmament. The common normative-practical denominator, then, is to let a nuclear weapon-free world appear both less desirable and less feasible than it might actually be. 相似文献
154.
J. Paul Dunne 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5-6):427-441
A large literature has used tests for Granger (1969) non‐causality, GNC, to examine the interaction of military spending with the economy. Such tests answer a specific although quite limited question: can one reject the null hypothesis that one variable does not help predict another? If one can reject, there is said to be Granger causality, GC. Although the limitations of GNC tests are well known, they are often not emphasised in the applied literature and so may be forgotten. This paper considers the econometric and methodological issues involved and illustrates them with data for the US and other countries. There are three main issues. First, the tests may not be informative about the substantive issue, the interaction of military expenditure and the economy, since Granger causality does not correspond to the usual notion of economic causality. To determine the relationship of the two notions of causality requires an identified structural model. Second, the tests are very sensitive to specification. GNC testing is usually done in the context of a vector autoregression, VAR, and the test results are sensitive to the variables and deterministic terms included in the VAR, lag length, sample or observation window used, treatment of integration and cointegration and level of significance. Statistical criteria may not be very informative about these choices. Third, since the parameters are not structural, the test results may not be stable over different time periods or different countries. 相似文献
155.
Manuel Acosta Daniel Coronado Esther Ferrandiz M. Rosario Marin Pedro J. Moreno 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(7):821-839
AbstractThis paper examines the generation of technological knowledge by leading companies in the defence industry. In particular, we test whether the characteristics of large defence companies are related to both the production of different types of patents (civilian, military and mixed), and the generation of dual-use technologies. To explore these links, we rely on economic data for the top 100 defence companies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, and patent information from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. Our results show that the relationship between the production of civilian patents and the size of the company is positive and significant. However, this relationship does not hold for the production of military patents. Furthermore, the military commercial profile is unrelated to the generation of military patents. Regarding the involvement in dual-use technologies, firms engaged in dual-use are those with higher military sales, a greater number of employees and a larger number of patents (civilian, military and mixed) than those not engaged in dual-use. Furthermore, we found a skill effect (more involvement in dual-use per employee) in European firms compared to US firms. These findings help to identify which firms should be targeted by government policies if increasing dual-use technologies becomes a political objective. 相似文献
156.
We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases. 相似文献
157.
B J PHIRI 《African Security Review》2013,22(4):125-134
Democratic rule requires, amongst other things, orderly civil-military relations. Zambia's military, with some exceptions, have generally remained under firm civilian control, unlike many forces in the region. Initially the military was based on the British colonial model but during the struggle for independence the force was indigenised. Instead of representing a colonial power, the military came to represent a specific political viewpoint: one party participatory democracy. President Kaunda, the leader of UNIP, was chiefly responsible for the politicisation of the military and ensuring its loyalty to the ruling party. Quasi-military institutions such as the Combined Cadet Force and the Home Guard Unit were useful links between civilian and military personnel. When Frederick Chiluba, leader of the MMD, took over in 1991 he tried to make the military more professional and curb its power over civilian affairs. A defence council and parliamentary regulation were instituted to avoid further military coups. 相似文献
158.
159.
160.
Robert J. Lieber 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):509-530
Many scholars, strategists and pundits contend that the US is in decline. They argue that America's national capabilities are significantly eroding, and that with the rise of important regional powers, its primacy in world affairs is rapidly diminishing as well. Yet America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and in the societal capacity to innovate and adapt. This article argues that the nature of material problems has been overstated, and that the US should be able to withstand modest erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. Instead, where limits to American primacy do exist, they are as or more likely to be ideational as they are material. The problem inheres as much or more in elite and societal beliefs, policy choices, and political will, as in economic, technological or manpower limitations at home, or the rise of peer competitors abroad. 相似文献