State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria

Abstract

The emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group's activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

A Criterion for Settling Inconsistencies in Clausewitz’s On War

On War’s unfinished state has been a source of difficulties for interpretation for 180 years. By establishing a hierarchy of revision among the parts, we propose a criterion that can bring any part of On War in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz’s thinking. We exemplify the utility, illustrate the underpinnings and appreciate the potential of this criterion. We argue that the criterion offers the prospect of a shared, coherent, fully consistent and faithful rendering of Clausewitz’s theory of war.     

The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War

After World War II, the US Navy confronted the challenge of adapting to dramatically altered geopolitical circumstances. Moscow did not have an ocean-going fleet, and early Cold War strategy was dominated by the salient position of nuclear strategic bombing – a mission thought to be outside the purview of the navy. Traditional roles, such as protecting sea lines of communication and supporting ground forces ashore, quickly proved indispensable. However, the navy eventually also succeeded in fielding dramatic technological and institutional innovations, for example, the strategic missile submarine, which enabled the US to successfully leverage maritime power against the continental power of the USSR.     

Proliferation and critical risk

Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers.

To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces.

Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike.