On optimal system designs in reliability‐economics frameworks

Reliability Economics is a field that can be defined as the collection of all problems in which there is tension between the performance of systems of interest and their cost. Given such a problem, the aim is to resolve the tension through an optimization process that identifies the system which maximizes some appropriate criterion function (e.g. expected lifetime per unit cost). In this paper, we focus on coherent systems of n independent and identically distributed (iid) components and mixtures thereof, and characterize both a system's performance and cost as functions of the system's signature vector (Samaniego, IEEE Trans Reliabil (1985) 69–72). For a given family of criterion functions, a variety of optimality results are obtained for systems of arbitrary order n. Approximations are developed and justified when the underlying component distribution is unknown. Assuming the availability of an auxiliary sample of N component failure times, the asymptotic theory of L‐estimators is adapted for the purpose of establishing the consistency and asymptotic normality of the proposed estimators of the expected ordered failure times of the n components of the systems under study. These results lead to the identification of ε‐optimal systems relative to the chosen criterion function. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Robust tower location for code division multiple access networks

Designing Code Division Multiple Access networks includes determining optimal locations of radio towers and assigning customer markets to the towers. In this paper, we describe a deterministic model for tower location and a stochastic model to optimize revenue given a set of constructed towers. We integrate these models in a stochastic integer programming problem with simple recourse that optimizes the location of towers under demand uncertainty. We develop algorithms using Benders' reformulation, and we provide computational results. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Trading coups for civil war

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency.     

Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Using real options analysis to value reoptimization options in the shifting bottleneck heuristic

The reoptimization procedure within the shifting bottleneck (SB) involves reevaluation of all previously scheduled toolgroup subproblems at each iteration of the SB heuristic. A real options analysis (ROA) model is developed to value the option to reoptimize in the SB heuristic, such that reoptimization only occurs when it is most likely to lead to a schedule with a lower objective function. To date, all ROA models have sought to value options financially (i.e., in terms of monetary value). The ROA model developed in this paper is completely original in that it has absolutely no monetary basis. The ROA methodologies presented are shown to greatly outperform both full and no reoptimization approaches with respect to both computation time and total weighted tardiness. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Requirements planning for modular products

The focus of this paper is on determining the requirements of different component options of a modular end‐product in an uncertain environment. We explicitly model two distinct sources of uncertainty: stochastic end‐product demand and unknown market proportions for the different product options available. Our cost minimizing model focuses on determining the optimal requirements policies for component options that meet a pre‐set service level. We show that simple common‐sense requirements policies are not generally optimal; there is a non‐linear connection between service level and component requirements that is hard to characterize without a detailed analysis. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006