Bayesian selling problem with partial information

We introduce an optimal stopping problem for selling an asset when the fixed but unknown distribution of successive offers is from one of n possible distributions. The initial probabilities as to which is the true distribution are given and updated in a Bayesian manner as the successive offers are observed. After receiving an offer, the seller has to decide whether to accept the offer or continue to observe the next offer. Each time an offer is observed a fixed cost is incurred. We consider both the cases where recalling a past offer is allowed and where it is not allowed. For each case, a dynamic programming model and some heuristic policies are presented. Using simulation, the performances of the heuristic methods are evaluated and upper bounds on the optimal expected return are obtained. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001–2006

Analytical focus on military operations in Iraq continue to overshadow analysis of the war in Afghanistan as it enters its sixth year. It is now possible to discern several clearly-delineated periods of coalition counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. What is the nature of the war and how has it evolved? Has there been success so far in Afghanistan?     

Human Capital,Natural Resource Scarcity and the Rwandan Genocide

Many authors contend that ethnic extremism coupled with political manipulation were the primary factors behind the Rwandan genocide. Yet, to oversimplify the cause of this tragedy makes one blind to the complicated nexus that generated the outcome. Even though this genocide was quick in its execution, the events that lead to this massacre took years to unfold. We argue that the evolution of human capital and the competition for scarce resources contributed to the genocide.     

Reassessing private military and security company (PMSC) ‘competition‘ in civil war: lessons from Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination.     

The origin of internal security in Colombia: Part I — A CIA special team surveys La Violencia, 1959–60

In October 1959 the Eisenhower administration dispatched a CIA Special Team to survey the violence problem in Colombia. This article, part one of a two‐part series, examines this first significant attempt by a US administration to influence that nation's internal security situation. It investigates the Special Team's actions and analyses its recommendations for transforming Colombia's conventionally‐orientated security forces. The Team's survey, which focuses on counter‐insurgency tactics, civil action, intelligence operations, psychological warfare, and covert action, is the foundation from which Colombia's modern internal security structures are derived.     

GM计数管能量响应的数值模拟研究

采用蒙特卡罗（MC）方法,对一款GM计数管对γ的能量响应进行了模拟计算,计算结果与实验结果比较,能量响应曲线的变化趋势比较一致,说明该模拟计算方法应用在计数管的设计和应用中是可行的．     

A produce‐to‐stock system with advance demand information and secondary customers

We consider a manufacturer (i.e., a capacitated supplier) that produces to stock and has two classes of customers. The primary customer places orders at regular intervals of time for a random quantity, while the secondary customers request a single item at random times. At a predetermined time the manufacturer receives advance demand information regarding the order size of the primary customer. If the manufacturer is not able to fill the primary customer's demand, there is a penalty. On the other hand, serving the secondary customers results in additional profit; however, the manufacturer can refuse to serve the secondary customers in order to reserve inventory for the primary customer. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production and stock reservation policies that maximize the manufacturer's discounted profit and the average profit per unit time. We show that these policies are threshold‐type policies, and these thresholds are monotone with respect to the primary customer's order size. Using a numerical study we provide insights into how the value of information is affected by the relative demand size of the primary and secondary customers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007