On efficient algorithms for finding efficient salvo policies

We consider the salvo policy problem, in which there are k moments, called salvos, at which we can fire multiple missiles simultaneously at an incoming object. Each salvo is characterized by a probability p_i: the hit probability of a single missile. After each salvo, we can assess whether the incoming object is still active. If it is, we fire the missiles assigned to the next salvo. In the salvo policy problem, the goal is to assign at most n missiles to salvos in order to minimize the expected number of missiles used. We consider three problem versions. In Gould's version, we have to assign all n missiles to salvos. In the Big Bomb version, a cost of B is incurred when all salvo's are unsuccessful. Finally, we consider the Quota version in which the kill probability should exceed some quota Q. We discuss the computational complexity and the approximability of these problem versions. In particular, we show that Gould's version and the Big Bomb version admit pseudopolynomial time exact algorithms and fully polynomial time approximation schemes. We also present an iterative approximation algorithm for the Quota version, and show that a related problem is NP-complete.     

Twittering for talent: Private military and security companies between business and military branding

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) play an increasingly important role in the provision of security-related services. In their attempts to win new clients and find suitable personnel, they take on different identities by presenting themselves as conventional businesses, military actors, and humanitarians. In this article, we examine how PMSCs deploy these identities when they recruit new personnel through social media. Our computer-assisted content analysis of Twitter messages posted by two major United States-based companies—CACI and DynCorp International—shows that while both PMSCs amplify their business and military identities to attract the most talented personnel, they construct and communicate these identities in different ways with CACI branding itself as a sophisticated, modern, and patriotic business and DynCorp as a home-grown, traditional military provider. In addition, our analysis lends force to scholars suggesting that state militaries and the private security sector compete increasingly for prospective employees using similar strategies.     

Fire truck relocation during major incidents

The effectiveness of a fire department is largely determined by its ability to respond to incidents in a timely manner. To do so, fire departments typically have fire stations spread evenly across the region, and dispatch the closest truck(s) whenever a new incident occurs. However, large gaps in coverage may arise in the case of a major incident that requires many nearby fire trucks over a long period of time, substantially increasing response times for emergencies that occur subsequently. We propose a heuristic for relocating idle trucks during a major incident in order to retain good coverage. This is done by solving a mathematical program that takes into account the location of the available fire trucks and the historic spatial distribution of incidents. This heuristic allows the user to balance the coverage and the number of truck movements. Using extensive simulation experiments we test the heuristic for the operations of the Fire Department of Amsterdam‐Amstelland, and compare it against three other benchmark strategies in a simulation fitted using 10 years of historical data. We demonstrate substantial improvement over the current relocation policy, and show that not relocating during major incidents may lead to a significant decrease in performance.     

Norms,Military Utility,and the Use/Non-use of Weapons: The Case of Anti-plant and Irritant Agents in the Vietnam War

The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways. First, I develop structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role – as structural realism expects – was played by military utility.