Optimal maintenance policies for constantly monitored systems

A multistate system is assumed to be constantly monitored; i.e., the state of the system is always known with certainty. Damage to the system accumulates via a continuous-time Markov process. A model of the system including restoration costs and state occupation costs is developed. It is shown that under certain conditions the optimal restoration policy for the system is a control limit rule. A control limit rule is a policy which requires restoration of the system whenever the damage exceeds a certain level. Examples are presented to show that there are several situations in which, perhaps surprisingly, control limit rules are not optimal.     

Bounds and properties of the expected value of sample information for a project-selection problem

In this article we extend the work of Mehrez and Stulman [5] on the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) to the expected value of sample information (EVSI) for a class of economic problems dealing with the decision to reject or accept an investment project. It is shown that shifting the mean of the underlying a priori distribution of X, the project's monetary value from zero in either direction will decrease the associated EVSI of Y, the random sampled information. A theorem is then presented which gives an upper bound on the EVSI over all distributions of Y, as well as the structure of the posterior mean E[X|Y] for which this upper bound is achieved. Finally, the case where E[X|Y] is linear in Y is discussed and its performance compared with that of the optimal case.     

The impotence of conventional arms control: why do international regimes fail when they are most needed?

Amid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia.     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017     

State and society in Asia

India and China are the 2 most populous countries of the world; in the 1950s, both countries initiated a centrally planned program for rapid development within vastly differing political systems. China embarked India's policy encouraged only voluntary acceptance of family planning. In both cases, however, government involvement in population forms a part of comprehensive national planning. Both countries rely on a limited resource base and technological sophistication in order to alleviate mass poverty and misery. The political implications of population growth cannot be neatly isolated from those that are generated by social and economic forces of change in a society that is in a transitional stage of modernization and development. Development has not been an unmixed bleesing; population growth is one of its counterproductive outcomes. The development process has begun to draw increasing attention to hitherto neglected correlates of fertility decline, such as a reduction in infant mortality, universal education, improvement in women's status, and women's participation in economic activity outside the home, all of which eventually result in greater demand for family planning services. Both the Indian and Chinese models highlight the importance of taking the people into one's confidence; the response of the common people to official initiatives is critical in securing a reduction in fertility levels. China has adopted a 1 child family policy, yet it is unreasonable to expect that the Indian people would agree to a nationally prescribed family size norm below 2 children. The principal determinant of future population trends in both these countries is the course of their politics. The success of developing countries will be assured if the developed nations support their progress without being worried about their population growth, which is the result of their unavoidable failure to modernize their social and economic structures.     

Maintaining systems with heterogeneous spare parts

We consider the problem of optimally maintaining a stochastically degrading, single‐unit system using heterogeneous spares of varying quality. The system's failures are unannounced; therefore, it is inspected periodically to determine its status (functioning or failed). The system continues in operation until it is either preventively or correctively maintained. The available maintenance options include perfect repair, which restores the system to an as‐good‐as‐new condition, and replacement with a randomly selected unit from the supply of heterogeneous spares. The objective is to minimize the total expected discounted maintenance costs over an infinite time horizon. We formulate the problem using a mixed observability Markov decision process (MOMDP) model in which the system's age is observable but its quality must be inferred. We show, under suitable conditions, the monotonicity of the optimal value function in the belief about the system quality and establish conditions under which finite preventive maintenance thresholds exist. A detailed computational study reveals that the optimal policy encourages exploration when the system's quality is uncertain; the policy is more exploitive when the quality is highly certain. The study also demonstrates that substantial cost savings are achieved by utilizing our MOMDP‐based method as compared to more naïve methods of accounting for heterogeneous spares.     

Information in two-stage programming under uncertainty

The random variables in two-stage programming under uncertainty are generally treated in a passive manner in that no information regarding the random variables or the process generating the random variables may be obtained. This paper develops the economics of information for the case in which the probability distributions are discrete. A multinomial process is assumed to generate the random variables, and the parameter vector of that process is assumed to be unknown. A Dirichlet prior distribution on the parameter vector is used, and the computation of the value of information thus involves a Dirichlet-multinomial distribution on the random variables. An example involving producing to meet uncertain demands is presented.     

MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN TANZANIA

This article attempts to understand the manner in which the notion of good governance has been applied in the United Republic of Tanzania. In 1989, the World Bank issued a document which argued that Africa's development problems were in essence a crisis of governance. This became the basis for the imposition of conditionalities in order to establish liberal democratic governments. More than a decade later, good governance still dominates the donor agenda, which is reminiscent of the heyday of colonialism and the civilising mission that thrust Africa into the orbit of the European world, albeit as a ‘dark continent’. Although Tanzania has escaped the more overt political turmoil that plagued neighbouring countries, the country appears to be open to inter-ethnic rivalry due largely to Zanzibar, the site of the greatest opposition to the ruling party, in power since independence. The challenge is to deal with the dysfunctional economy and to meet the growing demands of its population for adequate social services. The ideal of self-reliance espoused by Nyerere is no longer a choice but a necessity.