Single machine scheduling with a restricted rate‐modifying activity

In this paper we consider the problem of scheduling a set of jobs on a single machine on which a rate‐modifying activity may be performed. The rate‐modifying activity is an activity that changes the production rate of the machine. So the processing time of a job is a variable, which depends on whether it is scheduled before or after the rate‐modifying activity. We assume that the rate‐modifying activity can take place only at certain predetermined time points, which is a constrained case of a similar problem discussed in the literature. The decisions under consideration are whether and when to schedule the rate‐modifying activity, and how to sequence the jobs in order to minimize some objectives. We study the problems of minimizing makespan and total completion time. We first analyze the computational complexity of both problems for most of the possible versions. The analysis shows that the problems are NP‐hard even for some special cases. Furthermore, for the NP‐hard cases of the makespan problem, we present a pseudo‐polynomial time optimal algorithm and a fully polynomial time approximation scheme. For the total completion time problem, we provide a pseudo‐polynomial time optimal algorithm for the case with agreeable modifying rates. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning the State-based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to evaluate the threat of malicious chemical use by non-state actors. It finds that non-state actors have primarily turned to ready-to-use crude chemical weapons (CW) instead of traditional CW agents. Interestingly, the worst crude CW attacks have been more destructive than those employing traditional CW. Scenarios for catastrophic consequences exist, but chemical attacks have typically been used to accomplish tactical goals, which leverage psychological and economic impacts. Therefore, successful efforts to counter CW proliferation by non-state actors must be substantially different from those targeting states.     

The cost of production breaks

Disruptions in the production process can have a serious impact on production costs. Most of the previous literature which addresses the cost impact of production breaks attributes the observed increase in costs solely to “loss of learning.” We develop a mathematical model which implies that breaks in the unit learning curve can occur because of a production break, even under the assumption of no forgetting. In such cases, increases in unit cost can be caused by decreasing returns as the amount of time available to meet the delivery schedule decreases due to the production break.     

Optimal renewal policies for complex systems

Most maintenance and replacement models for industrial equipment have been developed for independent single-component machines. Most equipment, however, consists of multiple components. Also, when the maintenance crew services several machines, the maintenance policy for each machine is not independent of the states of the other machines. In this paper, two dynamic programming replacement models are presented. The first is used to determine the optimal replacement policy for multi-component equipment. The second is used to determine the optimal replacement policy for a multi-machine system which uses one replacement crew to service several machines. In addition, an approach is suggested for developing an efficient replacement policy for a multi-component, multi-machine system.     

An advanced dual algorithm with constraint relaxation for all-integer programming

In this article we present an all-integer cutting plane algorithm called the Reduced Advanced Start Algorithm (RASA). The technique incorporates an infeasible advanced start based on the optimal solution to the LP relaxation, and initially discards nonbinding constraints in this solution. We discuss the results of computational testing on a set of standard problems and illustrate the operation of the algorithm with three small examples.     

Countering Insurgent-terrorism: Why Nato Chose The Wrong Historical Foundation For Cimic

History teaches that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns have never been won through purely military action. Defeating an opponent who avoids open battle, but who uses force to reach his goals, including terrorist action, requires a combination of police, administrative, economic and military measures. As a counterinsurgency campaign should pursue a comprehensive political objective, it requires high levels of civil–military cooperation. However, current NATO doctrine for Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as it emerged from the 1990s is founded in conventional war-fighting and outdated peacekeeping doctrine. CIMIC's focus is on supporting military objectives rather than enabling the military to make a coherent contribution to political objectives. This makes CIMIC unfit for the Alliance's main operational challenges that have expanded from peace operations on the Balkans to countering insurgent terrorism in Afghanistan. When developing CIMIC, the Alliance obviously neglected the historical lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Uncovering foreign military innovation

An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War.     

The human consequences of foreign military intervention

The empirical international conflict literature has given much recent attention to interstate armed force’s impact on human well-being. While empirical research has advanced our understanding of the phenomenon considerably, we argue that one conclusion that many studies have reached is preliminary. Some recent research contends that only full-scale war, and not force short of war, has a discernable impact on human welfare or physical quality of life (PQOL). We develop theory on one type of force short of war, large-scale foreign military intervention (FMI), and its potential effects on PQOL. Using interrupted time series and panel corrected standard error methodologies, we find that from 1960 to 2005 large-scale FMI had a statistically and substantively significant impact on the PQOL of populations in 106 developing countries. The specific effect that this type of armed force has depended in large part on the regime type of the target country.     

Systems analysis and planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) for defense decision making

Systems analysis office titles have permeated both government and business organization charts in recent years. Systems analysis as a discipline, however, even though increasingly accepted, has eluded precise definition. For the most part, it has been loosely described as “quantitative common sense” and “the general application of the scientific method.” Emphasis is placed upon the application of eclectic disciplines to a wide variety of problems. Concepts and techniques have been drawn heavily from economics, mathematics, and political science. In the Department of Defense, systems analysis has been used extensively in the evaluation of weapon systems during the last 9 years. During the 1960's, it provided the underlying concepts for the control system PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System). This article traces the origins of systems analysis within the Department of Defense and describes and analyzes the application of the technique. Although there always exists disagreement, it is generally accepted that the origin of systems analysis coincided with the inception of R. S. McNamara's administration of the Department of Defense. McNamara organized the Systems Analysis office under Mr. Charles Hitch, who had previously developed many basic systems analysis concepts at project RAND. From Hitch's basic concepts, the approach became increasingly sophisticated in evaluating complex weapons systems. Coincidently, the organizational procedures for implementing systems analysis also evolved. Under the current Department of Defense administration, the new organizational procedures emerging are contrasted with the old.