An analysis of constrained robust regression estimators

Multicollinearity and nonnormal errors are problems often encountered in the application of linear regression. Estimators are proposed for dealing with the simultaneous occurrence of both multicollinearity and nonnormality. These estimators are developed by combining biased estimation techniques with certain robust criteria. An iteratively reweighted least-squares procedure is used to compute the estimates. The performance of the combined estimators is studied empirically through Monte Carlo experiments structured according to factorial designs. With respect to a mean-squared-error criterion, the combined estimators are superior to ordinary least-squares, pure biased estimators, and pure robust estimators when multicollinearity and nonnormality are present. The loss in efficiency for the combined estimators relative to least squares is small when these problems do not occur. Some guidelines for the use of these combined estimators are given.     

Determining optimal growth paths in logistics operations

This paper considers a logistics system modelled as a transportation problem with a linear cost structure and lower bounds on supply from each origin and to each destination. We provide an algorithm for obtaining the growth path of such a system, i. e., determining the optimum shipment patterns and supply levels from origins and to destinations, when the total volume handled in the system is increased. Extensions of the procedure for the case when the costs of supplying are convex and piecewise linear and for solving transportation problems that are not in “standard form” are discussed. A procedure is provided for determining optimal plant capacities when the market requirements have prespecified growth rates. A goal programming growth model where the minimum requirements are treated as goals rather than as absolute requirements is also formulated.     

A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game

An inspector's game is a non-constant-sum two-person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.     

On some stocxastic tactical antisubmarine games

Mathematical models of tactical problems in Hntisubmarine Warfare (ASW) are developed. Specifically, a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force. player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2 is considered. The game consists of a sequence of moves and terminates when player 2 is tcaught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player choosa-s a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined, Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game (TSG). Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution), An iterative technique to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy is proposed. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs. To introduce more realism into the game several variations of the TSG are also considered. One variation is a finite TSG and linear programming techniques are employed to find the solution.