Winston Churchill and the third front 1

The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy among local populations. The path to legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. However, good governance is not the only basis for claims to legitimacy, especially in environments where ethnic or religious identities are politically salient. Some experience in Iraq suggests that in environments where such identities are contested, claims to legitimacy may rest primarily on the identity of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs, governs. This article outlines the intellectual foundations of existing policy and doctrine on counterinsurgency, and argues that development and analysis of counterinsurgency strategy would benefit from a greater focus on the role of ethnic and religious identity in irregular warfare.     

Allocating capacity in parallel queues to improve their resilience to deliberate attack

We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs, when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well‐informed attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the queues to make the system resilient to worst‐case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three‐level sequential game of perfect information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero‐one random‐outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Landmarks in defense literature

The Brain of an Army: a Popular Account of the German General Staff. By Spenser Wilkinson. Archibald Constable, London (1st edition 1890, 2nd edition 1895)     

Real-time task scheduling with overheads considered

n periodic tasks are to be processed by a single machine, where each task i has a maximum request rate or periodicity F_i, a processing time E_i, a deadline D_i, relative to each request of task i, a task-request interrupt overhead I_i, and a task-independent scheduling overhead S. Two scheduling strategies are considered for sequencing the execution of an arbitrary arrangement of task requests in time: the preemptive and the nonpreemptive earliest-deadline algorithms. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for establishing whether a given set of tasks can be scheduled by each scheduling strategy. The conditions are given in the form of limited simulations of a small number of well-defined task-request arrangements. If all simulations succeed, the schedule is feasible for the given set of tasks. If any simulation fails, the schedule is infeasible. While interrupt handling and scheduling overheads can be handled by such simulations, context switching overhead resulting from preemption cannot. A counterexample illustrates how the simulations fail to uncover unschedulable task sets when context switching overhead is considered.