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521.
Michael Goodman 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):120-151
With relations with the Soviet Union growing ever ‘hotter’, it became essential for the British to comprehend Soviet atomic development. However, British intelligence had to rely on more overt methods of intelligence collection, which provided an inadequate basis from which to proceed. This was further hindered by the interpretation of such information on the basis of Anglo-American development and by the 1946 McMahon Act. Accordingly the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 was not accurately predicted by the British. Meanwhile British war planning centred on the year 1957, based – it was argued – on strategic forecasts. Yet the impact of recently released intelligence material throws this into question, and instead reveals that the date reflected British war readiness, rather than when British intelligence predicted the Soviet Union would have achieved the nuclear capability to wage a successful war. 相似文献
522.
Erik J Dahl 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):31-55
Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism. 相似文献
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This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy. 相似文献
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Michael Brzoska 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(1):67-80
Available sources value transfers of weapons irrespective of whether they are paid for and how. Data from the U.S. indicates that the shares of arms given for free or on credit are high. If other arms exporters, all military aid and all credits used for military purposes are considered, which is done here on the basis of rough estimates and an opportunity cost model, the true cash costs of weapons in the year of the actual transfer are small. On the other hand, the financial burden of earlier arms imports via debt service has grown over time. It most probably exceeded the true cash cost of imports of arms in the late 1980s. Large differences between arms transfer data and the actual true costs of arms transfers means that analysis of the economic effects of arms imports without considering these financial aspects makes little sense. 相似文献
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Matthew J. Morgan 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):147-169
The Western way of warfare has not prepared the US Army or American society for appreciating an approach to national security that does not yield decisive and measurable outcomes. This proclivity may have significant consequences given the changing nature of the international security environment in the twenty-first century. In order to preserve national security and global stability, American strategic thinkers must understand the evolution of the national strategic culture. Then adjustments must be made to deal effectively with the challenges of a changed world order. Rather than limiting the use of force to decisive means and outcomes, the American military profession must be seriously prepared for success in less dramatic stability and support missions. 相似文献
530.
J. N.C. Hill 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):4-31
The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir. 相似文献