Interception in a network

This paper presents an algorithm for determining where to place intercepting units in order to maximize the probability of preventing an opposing force from proceeding from one particular node in an undirected network to another. The usual gaming assumptions are invoked; namely, the strategy for placing the units is known to the opponent and he will choose a path through the network which, based on this knowledge, maximizes his probability of successful traverse. As given quantities, the model requires a list of the arcs and nodes of the network, the number of intercepting units available to stop the opposing force, and the probabilities for stopping the opposition at the arcs and nodes as functions of the number of intercepting units placed there. From these quantities, the algorithm calculates the probabilities for placing the unit at the arcs and nodes when one intercepting unit is available, and the expected numbers of units to place at the arcs and nodes when multiple intercepting units are available.     

A solution for queues with instantaneous jockeying and other customer selection rules

This paper presents a general solution for the M/M/r queue with instantaneous jockeying and r > 1 servers. The solution is obtained in matrices in closed form without recourse to the generating function arguments usually used. The solution requires the inversion of two (Z^r?1) × (2^r?1) matrices. The method proposed is extended to allow different queue selection preferences of arriving customers, balking of arrivals, jockeying preference rules, and queue dependent selection along with jockeying. To illustrate the results, a problem previously published is studied to show how known results are obtained from the proposed general solution.     

A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game

An inspector's game is a non-constant-sum two-person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.     

On some stocxastic tactical antisubmarine games

Mathematical models of tactical problems in Hntisubmarine Warfare (ASW) are developed. Specifically, a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force. player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2 is considered. The game consists of a sequence of moves and terminates when player 2 is tcaught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player choosa-s a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined, Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game (TSG). Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution), An iterative technique to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy is proposed. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs. To introduce more realism into the game several variations of the TSG are also considered. One variation is a finite TSG and linear programming techniques are employed to find the solution.