Optimal search using two nonconcurrent sensors

Search for a stationary target is considered for a situation in which two sensors are available, but cannot be used simultaneously. The cost (in time) of switching from one sensor to the other is ignored, and each sensor is assumed to have perfect discrimination. For a specified class of searches an optimal allocation of search effort is obtained. In the case of a circular normal prior target location distribution, an example is presented in which one sensor is assumed to have a fixed sweep width and the other a stochastic sweep width. An optimal plan is found for this example. This plan produces an allocation of search effort which is expended in a disk by one sensor and in a bounding annulus by the other.     

Simplified estimates of the parameters of the double exponential distribution based on optimum order statistics from a middle-censored sample

In an ordered sample from a given population, a few of the consecutive observations from somewhere in the middle may be missing Further, we may be constrained to use a few, and not all, of the remaining observations for purposes of estimation of population parameters. In this paper, such a situation is considered for the double exponential distribution and best linear unbiased estimates are obtained for its parameters, based on a choice of an optimum set of order statistics when the number of observations in the set are prefixed.     

On nash subsets and mobility chains in bimatrix games

This work is concerned with constructing, analyzing, and finding “mobility chains” for bimatrix games, sequences of equilibrium points along which it is possible for the two players to progress, one equilibrium point at a time, to an equilibrium point that is preferred by both players. The relationship between mobility chains and Nash subsets is established, and some properties of maximal Nash subsets are proved.     

Estimation of strategies in a markov game

In this paper a two-person Markov game, in discrete time, and with perfect state information, is considered from the point of view of a single player (player A) only. It is assumed that A's opponent (player B) uses the same strategy every time the game is played. It is shown that A can obtain a consistent estimate of B's strategy on the basis of his past experience of playing the game with B. Two methods of deriving such an estimate are given. Further, it is shown that using one of these estimates A can construct a strategy for himself which is asymptotically optimal. A simple example of a game in which the above method may be useful is given.     

A defense allocation problem with development costs

In this paper, the mathematical model for the allocation of resources among a general mix of percentage vulnerable and of numerically vulnerable weapon systems is presented and solved. Percentage vulnerable systems consist of mobile weapons which are difficult to locate, but relatively easy to destroy once located; numerically vulnerable systems comprise easily located fixed base weapons which are difficult to destroy. The distinguishing feature of this analysis is the inclusion of development costs. The theory of max-min is extended as necessary to solve this problem. References are provided to a sequence of earlier versions of this problem.     

A convex property of an ordered flow shop sequencing problem

A flow shop sequencing problem with ordered processing time matrices is considered. A convex property for the makespan sequences of such problems is discussed. On the basis of this property an efficient optimizing algorithm is presented. Although the proof of optimality has not been developed, several hundred problems were solved optimally with this procedure.     

A manpower planning/capital budgeting model (MAPCAB)

A deterministic resource allocation model is developed to optimize defense effectiveness subject to budget, manpower, and risk constraints. The model consists of two major submodels connected by a heuristic. The first is a mathematical program which optimizes the multiperiod weapon mix subject to the constraint set. The second is a manpower supply model based on a transition matrix in which individual transitions are functions of personnel related budgets and historical transition rates. The heuristic marries the submodels through an iterative process leading to improved solutions. An example is provided which demonstrates how systems are undercosted and overprocured if manpower supply is not properly reflected relative to manpower demand.     

A note on a paper by W. Szwarc

In this note the authors call for a change of the optimality criteria given by Theorem 3 in section 5 of the paper of W. Szwarc “On Some Sequencing Problems” in NRLQ Vol. 15, No. 2 [2]. Further, two cases of the three machine problem, namely, (i) ≦ and (ii) ≦ are considered, and procedures for obtaining optimal sequences in these cases are given. In these cases the three-machine problem is solved by solving n (the number of jobs) two-machine problems.     

Dynamic programming approach to the optimization of Naval aircraft rework and replacement policies

This paper describes a method for determining optimal repair and replacement policies for aireraft, with specific reference to the F–4. The objective of the analysis is to choose the set of policies from all possible alternatives over a finite planning horizon which minimizes the cost of operations. A dynamic program is presented which seeks an optimal path through a series of decision periods, when each period begins with the choice of keeping an aircraft, reworking it before further operation, or buying a new one. We do not consider changes in technology. Therefore, when a replacement does occur, it is made with a similar aircraft. Multivariate statistical techniques are used to estimate the relevant costs as a function of age, and time since last rework.     

Finite statistical games and linear programming

The dual linear programs associated with finite statistical games are investigated and their optimal solutions are interpreted. The usual statistical game is generalized to a two-sided (inference) game and its possible application as a tactical model is discussed.