Operational definitions of inventory record accuracy

An inventory stock record is in error when the information on the stock record is not in agreement with the actual physical situation. We address the questions of what is meant by inventory record accuracy as reported in the literature and what should be meant by this term, in the context of the inventory record accuracy problem defined by the Naval Supply Systems Command. The need for, and suggestions of, operational definitions of error measures are demonstrated in terms of the reporting of accuracy statistics, the formulation of inventory record accuracy goals, and the determination of corrective measures.     

On the minimization of a certain convex function arising in applied decision theory

The author, in an expository paper [4], has presented an algorithm for choosing a non-negative vector

     

A deterministic inventory model for reparable items

A reparable inventory system has two distinct inventories within it—the inventory of items ready-for-issue and the inventory of carcasses available for repair. A reparable item is usually rebuilt upon failure, but the scrap rate in the repair process is generally positive. Consequently, new items must be procured from time to time to replace those item: which were scrapped. The ready-for-issue inventory has two input sources—procurement and repair, This paper develops a deterministic inbentory model for the reparable inventory system, and determines the optimal procurement and repair quantities.     

Evaluating insurgent/counterinsurgent performance

Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance ‘starts on the streets’, so to speak. Specifically, the five rules of assessment are common sense: (1) become familiar with the area in question; (2) slice up the analytical target into manageable slices; (3) carry out longitudinal studies; (4) look at the role played by ideas in this political warfare; and (5) assess the relationship between structural and purposive elements. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important. Similar factors obtain on the counter‐insurgent side. In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain.