Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security’

Building upon a far-reaching reform movement carried out during the administration of Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), the Colombian military emerged in the Alvaro Uribe first term (2002–06) as a powerful, flexible organization capable of implementing a national strategy for successful counterinsurgency. Sweeping organizational change was accompanied by advances in operational art and tactics, as well as the promotion of new leadership tested in combat. A growing maturity in civil–military relations enabled national advances in democratic politics, economic progress and state integration, the latter to a degree unprecedented in Colombian history.     

Review Article: Reading Guerrilla Radio in Wartime Liberia

Numerous writers have acknowledged the importance of radio communications and hate propaganda in the Liberian civil war (1990–1997), but none have explored the subject in depth. A wide variety of related issues have been neglected, including military efforts to seize control of broadcast facilities, the deliberate manipulation of public information and perceptions, and the implications of both for wartime atrocities and post-war justice. In the following essay, I identify and discuss six general strands of thought on guerrilla radio broadcasting and communications in wartime Liberia. The first looks to the relationship between mass media and the state in the pre-civil war era. The second covers the cooption of the wartime free press. Three further themes – Charles Taylor's cultivation of personal power, the relevance of broadcasting for rebel command and control capabilities, and Taylor's media dominance during the 1997 Presidential campaign – demonstrate the strategic and public roles of radio communications and broadcasting. Finally, I look to written survivor memoirs for elite responses to wartime media monopolies, guerrilla propaganda, and psychological warfare. I conclude with some notes on indicators for future research, and their implications for historical and contemporary issues in Liberia.     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

Design of accelerated life testing plans under multiple stresses

Accelerated life testing (ALT) using multiple stresses is commonly used in practice to resemble the operating stresses at normal operating conditions and obtain failure observations in a much shorter time. However, to date, there is little research into the theory of planning ALT for reliability estimation with multiple stresses. ALT with multiple stresses can result in a large number of stress‐level combinations which presents a challenge for implementation. In this article, we propose an approach for the design of ALT plans with multiple stresses and formulate multistress test plans based on different objectives and practical constraints. We develop a simulated annealing algorithm to efficiently determine the testing plan parameters. We demonstrate the proposed method with examples based on an actual test conducted using three stress types. The obtained optimal test plans are compared with those based on fractional factorial design. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 468–478, 2013     

Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 20, 2013

The United States has multiple nuclear detection initiatives to secure against a terrorist nuclear attack, including the Container Security Initiative, installation of radiation detectors at U.S. border points of entry, and establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The current nuclear detection system architecture falls short of being able to reliably catch fissile nuclear material in transit, specifically shielded Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu), both within the US and abroad. Checkpoints at border crossings can be circumvented, and no adequate system is under development to deter the transport of fissile materials. Using nuclear link-budget calculations, we show why a network relying primarily on handhelds, fixed detectors, and portals is not sufficient. We examine the technical, economic, and operational feasibility of a comprehensive national network incorporating in-vehicle detectors to reliably detect and deter the transport of fissile material inside the vehicle itself.     

What determines military allocations in Africa: Theoretical and empirical investigations

This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the determinants of military spending in Africa. It specifies a formal model and uses time‐series and cross‐sectional estimations to ascertain the reasons behind variations in military allocations across and within 40 African countries during 1960–1991. The differences in military expenditures appear to reflect a complex of economic, political, and strategic factors at both national and international levels. Strategic considerations are, however, found to be the most important factors in most African countries.