Waiting time analysis of the M/G/1 queue with finite retrial group

We consider an M/G/1 retrial queue with finite capacity of the retrial group. First, we obtain equations governing the dynamic of the waiting time. Then, we focus on the numerical inversion of the density function and the computation of moments. These results are used to approximate the waiting time of the M/G/1 queue with infinite retrial group for which direct analysis seems intractable. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Switching costs,dynamic uncertainty,and buyer–seller relationships

We analyze strategic relationships between buyers and sellers in markets with switching costs and dynamic uncertainty by investigating the scenario wherein a representative buyer trades with two foreign sellers located in the same foreign country. We show that, under exchange rate uncertainty, switching costs may lead to switching equilibria where both sellers co‐exist in the market with the buyer, or no‐switching equilibria where either seller captures the market. The presence of exchange rate uncertainty facilitates competition by allowing the sellers to co‐exist in the market with the buyer. However, if the level of uncertainty is beyond a threshold, the only viable equilibria are those where one of the sellers captures the market. Further, depending on the level of exchange rate uncertainty and the sellers' variable costs, switching costs may either raise or lower the level of prices in long‐term contracts between the buyer and the sellers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

Does Spoiling Work? Assessing the Impact of Spoilers on Civil War Peace Agreements

Scholars and policymakers argue that violent actors – termed ‘spoilers’ – pose a significant threat to civil war peace agreements. Yet existing research, which is overly reliant on single-case studies, has not effectively determined how prevalent spoiling is, or thoroughly examined what its ultimate effects are on peace agreements. This article draws on a newly constructed cross-national dataset of spoiling following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era to analyze spoiling. It finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not as common as typically assumed, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements. Moreover, most actors who resort to this strategy typically fail in their goals and the agreement is not at risk, despite the high publicity and attention given to these threats. Yet particular types of actors, most notably paramilitaries and state security forces excluded from the agreement, can pose a significant threat to peace.     

The Determinants of Arms Production

This study analyzes the determinants of arms production in 15 countries using annual panel data from 1997 to 2002. The results suggest that real GDP per capita, military expenditures, arms exports, and arms imports are positively related to arms production.     

Optimal control of noncollaborative servers in two‐stage tandem queueing systems

We consider two‐stage tandem queueing systems with dedicated servers in each station and a flexible server that is trained to serve both stations. We assume no arrivals, exponential service times, and linear holding costs for jobs present in the system. We study the optimal dynamic assignment of servers to jobs assuming a noncollaborative work discipline with idling and preemptions allowed. For larger holding costs in the first station, we show that (i) nonidling policies are optimal and (ii) if the flexible server is not faster than the dedicated servers, the optimal server allocation strategy has a threshold‐type structure. For all other cases, we provide numerical results that support the optimality of threshold‐type policies. Our numerical experiments also indicate that when the flexible server is faster than the dedicated server of the second station, the optimal policy may have counterintuitive properties, which is not the case when a collaborative service discipline is assumed. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 435–446, 2014     

Service design at diagnostic service centers

We study a service design problem in diagnostic service centers, call centers that provide medical advice to patients over the phone about what the appropriate course of action is, based on the caller's symptoms. Due to the tension between increased diagnostic accuracy and the increase in waiting times more in‐depth service requires, managers face a difficult decision in determining the optimal service depth to guide the diagnostic process. The specific problem we consider models the situation when the capacity (staffing level) at the center is fixed, and when the callers have both congestion‐ and noncongestion‐related costs relating to their call. We develop a queueing model incorporating these features and find that the optimal service depth can take one of two different structures, depending on factors such as the nurses' skill level and the maximum potential demand. Sensitivity analyses of the two optimal structures show that they are quite different. In some situations, it may (or may not) be optimal for the manager to try to expand the demand at the center, and increasing skill level may (or may not) increase congestion. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012