15000m~3钢板贴壁油罐建设静态投资分析

以部队某保障基地油库军用柴油扩容工程采用钢板贴壁工艺新建的1座15 000 m3地下水封油池为例,从技术经济学角度对钢板贴壁油罐作了静态投资分析。该钢板贴壁油罐静态总投资1 756.95万元,其中占总投资比例最高者为地下工程建设,达到53.76%,库容投资1 171.30元/m3。结果表明:钢板贴壁油罐较地下水封石洞油罐整体经济效益明显;投资定额可供编制预算参考。     

一种彩色地图自动分层的快速算法

彩色地图扫描数据自动分层是地图数字化的关键技术之一。在研究了彩色地图扫描数据中客观存在的颜色误差后,根据彩色地图颜色的变化规律,提出了一种快速分层算法。实验结果表明,利用该方法所得到的分层结果可以快速解决彩色地图的自动分层问题。     

桅杆模型中纤绳初张力识别

桅杆有限元模型一般用实测平衡张力作为纤绳的初张力,研究表明这种做法对桅杆振动特性的影响不可忽略,有必要对有限元模型中纤绳初张力进行识别。针对实测数据可能少于、恰好或多于能确定纤绳初张力所需数目等3种情况,分别给出了纤绳初张力的识别方法,并结合算例对方法进行了验证,结果表明其方法执行效率高,提高了桅杆有限元分析的准确性。     

基于多目标决策理论武器装备效能综合评估方法

探讨一种适用范围较大的武器装备效能评估方法。基于多目标决策理论的方法,将武器系统效能评估的量化标尺评价法、模糊评价法、矩阵相乘法(ADC法)和专家评价法等方法结合起来,利用解析的形式,对武器装备的效能评估进行研究,给出了一个综合评价值,能够有效地评估武器装备的效能。这种研究是对量化标尺度量法的扩充。     

一类军事技术创新模型的定性分析

应用非线性动力系统的定性理论方法,研究了一类军事技术创新非线性动力系统模型的无闭轨性、奇点的李雅朴诺夫稳定性及全局稳定性,并对结论进行了分析解释.     

机载DIRCM激光发射平台主支撑框架设计

机载DIRCM球型发射平台体积小、重量轻,跟瞄更为灵活、精确。应用有限元模态分析理论,对平台主支撑框架动态特性进行研究。通过建模,分析,确立最合理的设计方案。     

轮式车辆装备保障力量战场运用系统

通过分析轮式车辆装备保障力量战场运用系统的总体功能、开发原则及其基本构成,建立起整个系统的逻辑结构图,包括保障模块数据库、保障模块匹配分系统以及数据映射分系统3个主要部分。在此基础上,采用数据库技术开发出一套较为完善的系统,实现了从保障参数录入到模块化保障力量编组方案生成的全部功能。最后进行了实例验证。     

A sequential auction‐bargaining procurement model

One of the most important decisions that a firm faces in managing its supply chain is a procurement decision: selecting suitable suppliers among many potential competing sellers and reducing the purchase cost. While both auctions and bargaining have been extensively studied in the literature, the research that combines auctions and bargaining is limited. In this article, we consider a combined auction‐bargaining model in a setting where a single buyer procures an indivisible good from one of many competing sellers. The procurement model that we analyze is a sequential model consisting of the auction phase followed by the bargaining phase. In the auction phase, the sellers submit bids, and the seller with the lowest bid is selected as the winning bidder. In the bargaining phase, the buyer audits the cost of the winning seller and then negotiates with him to determine the final price. For this auction‐bargaining model, we find a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for the sellers in a closed form, which is simple to understand and closely related to the classical results in the auction and bargaining literature. We also show that the auction‐bargaining model generates at least as much profit to the buyer as the standard auction or sequential bargaining model. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010