The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

The Royal Navy's Polaris lobby, 1955–62

This article examines the background to the Royal Navy's acquisition of Polaris. The conventional wisdom is that the Navy had little interest in Polaris, which was foisted on it upon the cancellation of Skybolt. Extensive use of files in the Public Record Office is made to mount the contrary argument, that the Admiralty had been interested in the submarine-launched ballistic missile since at least 1955, that there was widespread support for it among the Naval Staff, that a substantial amount of preparatory work was undertaken with the assistance of the US Navy, and that the naval staff were prepared to accept the deterrent role. Naval tactics – to play a waiting game and feign indifference – have contributed to the establishment of the orthodox interpretation, as has the view that the Navy was handicapped by the lack of a body of doctrine within which the deterrent role could be accommodated. The article shows that the orthodox account cannot be sustained by the evidence, which points to a naval triumph in terms of Whitehall politics and inter-service competition.     

All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”     

Programming challenges and impediments to reform: identifying pragmatic solutions

Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region’s defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural “audits,” (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.     

Multivariate meta analysis with potentially correlated marketing study results

A univariate meta analysis is often used to summarize various study results on the same research hypothesis concerning an effect of interest. When several marketing studies produce sets of more than one effect, multivariate meta analysis can be conducted. Problems one might have with such a multivariate meta analysis are: (1) Several effects estimated in one model could be correlated to each other but their correlation is seldom published and (2) an estimated effect in one model could be correlated to the corresponding effect in the other model due to similar model specification or the data set partly shared, but their correlation is not known. Situations like (2) happen often in military recruiting studies. We employ a Monte‐Carlo simulation to evaluate how neglecting such potential correlation affects the result of a multivariate meta analysis in terms of Type I, Type II errors, and MSE. Simulation results indicate that such effect is not significant. What matters is rather the size of the variance component due to random error in multivariate effects. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 500–510, 2000.