The vanguard's dilemma: understanding and exploiting insurgent strategies

The purpose of this paper is to provide a better conceptualization of insurgent strategies. Specifically, I shall examine Che Guevara's ‘Foco’ theory of insurgency, as it is one of the most theoretically popular and most pervasive strategies of insurgency currently practiced throughout the world. After briefly examining the origins, objectives, and theoretical strengths of the Foco theory (also known as the Vanguard Theory), I will argue that Guevara's theory suffers from an internal tension that I term the ‘Vanguard's Dilemma’. The significance of this dilemma creates a tension within the Vanguard Theory that can be fatal for insurgents if properly exploited by counterinsurgent operations. This paper will examine in detail this dilemma and show how it can be exploited. Given that several insurgent groups within Iraq and Afghanistan currently adhere to the Vanguard Theory of insurgency, a proper understanding of this insurgent strategy is an essential first step in the long road towards confronting and winning asymmetrical conflicts.     

A robust sensor covering and communication problem

We consider the problem of placing sensors across some area of interest. The sensors must be placed so that they cover a fixed set of targets in the region, and should be deployed in a manner that allows sensors to communicate with one another. In particular, there exists a measure of communication effectiveness for each sensor pair, which is determined by a concave function of distance between the sensors. Complicating the sensor location problem are uncertainties related to sensor placement, for example, as caused by drifting due to air or water currents to which the sensors may be subjected. Our problem thus seeks to maximize a metric regarding intrasensor communication effectiveness, subject to the condition that all targets must be covered by some sensor, where sensor drift occurs according to a robust (worst‐case) mechanism. We formulate an approximation approach and develop a cutting‐plane algorithm to solve this problem, comparing the effectiveness of two different classes of inequalities. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 582–594, 2015     

The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis∗

Estimating demand functions for developing countries before and after the end of the Cold War, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) found little evidence of any change in the underlying relationship. One concern with their analysis was that the use of cross-section averages might have obscured important time series effects. This paper deals with this issue by analysing their data using static and dynamic panel data methods. This produces evidence of a change in relationship and suggests that the focus in the literature on cross-section analyses has indeed limited our understanding of important dynamic processes at work within countries.     

Estimated UK employment dependent on ministry of defence expenditure and defence exports

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has published estimates of the number of average full‐time UK industry employees dependent on MOD expenditure and defence exports for a number of years. This paper provides the outcome of a recent review of the process used. The method of deriving MOD and defence export final demand vectors, and calculating from these estimates of direct employment (i.e. that in supplying companies) and indirect employment (i.e. that incurred through the supply chain) are described. Difficulties with the data are explored. Alternative approaches, methods used in other countries and challenges posed by changing MOD administrative systems are briefly discussed.     

Military Debt: Perspectives from the Experience of Arab Countries

The sectoral production function model of Feder (1983) has been widely used to examine the link between defence spending and economic growth. In this paper, the model, for which too much has been claimed in some past work, is examined, and the case is made for using growth in real non‐defence output rather than growth in real aggregate output (inclusive of military spending) as the dependent variable. Attention is restricted to a small group of OECD countries for which reliable labour force and capital stock (as well as defence) data are obtainable. With non‐defence output as the dependent variable and using only high quality data, no evidence in favour of the underconsumptionist (as opposed to the defence as a burden) position is found.     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Defence expenditures have both costs and benefits to the economy. The costs of defence expenditures are mainly emphasized as opportunity costs. On the other hand, defence spending may have growth‐promoting potential benefits: a rise in defence spending may result in a higher aggregate demand, production and employment. This paper examines empirically the effects of military expenditures on economic growth for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, for the time‐period 1989–1999. The relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is investigated by using cross‐section and dynamic panel estimation techniques. Empirical analysis indicates that military expenditure enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey as a whole.     

THE ‘PRICE’ OF TERRORISM

Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not been hitherto defined in an economically meaningful way. This paper provides a precise definition by treating the terrorists’ resource endowment as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence with a price equal to the summed value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped with this definition, an equilibrium model of the price of terrorism is deployed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists’ risk aversion at the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical conclusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The implications for policy are discussed.     

MODELS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH: A CRITICAL REVIEW

This paper reviews some of the theoretical and econometric issues involved in estimating growth models that include military spending. While the mainstream growth literature has not found military expenditure to be a significant determinant of growth, much of the defence economics literature has found significant effects. The paper argues that this is largely the product of the particular specification, the Feder–Ram model, that has been used in the defence economics literature but not in the mainstream literature. The paper critically evaluates this model, detailing its problems and limitations and suggests that it should be avoided. It also critically evaluates two alternative theoretical approaches, the Augmented Solow and the Barro models, suggesting that they provide a more promising avenue for future research. It concludes with some general comments about modelling the links between military expenditure and growth.     

ANALYSING THE DETERMINANTS OF TERRORISM IN TURKEY USING GEOGRAPHICALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSION

This paper investigates the determinants of provincial terrorism in Turkey taking spatial dimension into account for the time period 1990–2006. Following a traditional global regression analysis, spatial variations in the relationships are examined with geographically weighted regression (GWR) to obtain locally different parameter estimates. Empirical results indicate that increases in income and schooling ratio tend to reduce the provincial average level of terrorism, whereas an increase in unemployment enhances it. Moreover, GWR results indicate that the provincial effects of per capita income and education are more pronounced for the Eastern and South Eastern provinces compared to the Western provinces.     

SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals’ level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals’ efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher’s roughly articulated concept of ‘plunging’. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model’s implications for current US military force structure planning.