British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya

This paper uses recently-released material from the ‘migrated archives’ to provide an original counterinsurgency analysis of the TNKU revolt in Brunei and Sarawak from December 1962 to May 1963. It argues that, despite a failure to act upon intelligence predicting the outbreak of insurgency, Britain developed a highly effective counterinsurgency organisation. These records also indicate that decision-makers drew inspiration from the Malayan Emergency to inform success in Brunei. Although Malaya has been challenged as a counterinsurgency paradigm, the Brunei operations show the utility of striking a balance between inappropriately copying from past campaigns and developing best practices applicable to the unique environment of Borneo. In turn, the evolution of effective operational practices in Brunei informed their successful application to the subsequent Indonesian Confrontation.     

Dynamic pricing and inventory control with learning

Optimal operating policies and corresponding managerial insight are developed for the decision problem of coordinating supply and demand when (i) both supply and demand can be influenced by the decision maker and (ii) learning is pursued. In particular, we determine optimal stocking and pricing policies over time when a given market parameter of the demand process, though fixed, initially is unknown. Because of the initially unknown market parameter, the decision maker begins the problem horizon with a subjective probability distribution associated with demand. Learning occurs as the firm monitors the market's response to its decisions and then updates its characterization of the demand function. Of primary interest is the effect of censored data since a firm's observations often are restricted to sales. We find that the first‐period optimal selling price increases with the length of the problem horizon. However, for a given problem horizon, prices can rise or fall over time, depending on how the scale parameter influences demand. Further results include the characterization of the optimal stocking quantity decision and a computationally viable algorithm. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 303–325, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10013     

Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution1

The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution.     

“This program will not be a threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China

Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap.     

Some renewal theory results with application to fleet warranties

The fleet warranty guarantees the purchaser of a large population of like items that the mean life of the fleet will meet or exceed some negotiated mean μ_L. If the mean life is less than μ_L, compensation may be given in terms of a number of free replacement parts R. The expected number of replacements E[R] is studied based upon how the mean life of items in the field is determined and on whether the sampling window starts at time t = 0 (ordinary renewal process) or at some arbitrarily large time w (equilibrium renewal process). Properties of E[R] are compared and examples are given. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A nonidentical parallel processor scheduling problem

The problem considered in this article is a generalization of the familiar makespan problem, in which n jobs are allocated among m parallel processors, so as to minimize the maximum time (or cost) on any processor. Our problem is more general, in that we allow the processors to have (a) different initial costs, (b) different utilization levels before new costs are incurred, and (c) different rates of cost increase. A heuristic adapted from the bin-packing problem is shown to provide solutions which are close to optimal as the number of iterations is allowed to increase. Computational testing, over a large number of randomly generated problem instances, suggests that heuristic errors are, on average, very small.     

Non-violent Resistance and Last Resort

It is commonly accepted that recourse to war is justifiable only as a last resort. If a situation can be resolved by less harmful means, then war is unjust. It is also commonly accepted that violent actions in war should be necessary and proportionate. Violent actions in war are unjust if the end towards which those actions are means can be achieved by less harmful means. In this article, I argue that satisfaction of the last resort criterion depends in part upon the likelihood of success of non-violent alternatives to war, and that the actual and potential effectiveness of non-violent resistance means that the last resort criterion of the jus ad bellum and the proportionality criterion of the jus in bello are harder to satisfy than is often presumed.