Making sense of the Southern African Development Community

SADC has a poor record in advancing peace and security in Southern Africa. Many identify poor policy frameworks and weak technical capacities as the major obstacles. Laurie Nathan goes beyond these easy explanations in his important new book on SADC. Absence of common democratic values and reluctance to surrender state sovereignty are key factors preventing SADC from making progress according to this book. This article argues that Nathan overstates the case and that there are real prospects and potentials for making further progress in regional cooperation. The lessons from the history of European integration also points to the important role of regional leadership. South Africa, in coalition with other likeminded countries, may still be in a position to move the SADC project forward.     

MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION

The Middle East is a crucial region for the global nonproliferation regime. In 2010, the state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone. The nuclear weapon-free zone model, on which this idea builds, has achieved important results in other regions, but faces especially stark challenges in the Middle East. However, the attempt to apply the boldly imaginative zone approach to the Middle East holds promise for building a more inclusive dialogue on nonproliferation and regional security.     

CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ZAMBIAN MILITARY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Democratic rule requires, amongst other things, orderly civil-military relations. Zambia's military, with some exceptions, have generally remained under firm civilian control, unlike many forces in the region. Initially the military was based on the British colonial model but during the struggle for independence the force was indigenised. Instead of representing a colonial power, the military came to represent a specific political viewpoint: one party participatory democracy. President Kaunda, the leader of UNIP, was chiefly responsible for the politicisation of the military and ensuring its loyalty to the ruling party. Quasi-military institutions such as the Combined Cadet Force and the Home Guard Unit were useful links between civilian and military personnel. When Frederick Chiluba, leader of the MMD, took over in 1991 he tried to make the military more professional and curb its power over civilian affairs. A defence council and parliamentary regulation were instituted to avoid further military coups.     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces

The Indian government has not made a public comment about the status of its nuclear weapon program since approving a nuclear doctrine in 2003. However, there is now enough information in the public domain to determine that the command-and-control system for the nuclear program has steadily matured in accordance with the intent of the approved nuclear doctrine. The Indian government has successfully mitigated many of the issues that plague the conventional military. The result is a basic command-and-control system that is focused only on the delivery, if ordered by the prime minister, of nuclear weapons. The system is not as robust as those of the United States and Russia, but is in place and ready as new Indian nuclear weapons enter into operation. The command-and-control system is developing to meet India's needs and political compulsions, but not necessarily as part of a more assertive nuclear policy.     

Design and estimation for small sample sensitivity testing

In sensitivity testing for the Department of Defense, the high cost of experimental units necessitates the use of small sample sizes and accentuates the importance of design. This article compares five data collection-estimation procedures. Four of these are modifications of the Robbins-Monro method, and the other is the Langlie. The simulation study is designed as a factorial experiment with response function, sample size, initial design point, gate width, and noise as factors. The estimated V₅₀ and its MSE are the responses compared to assess the small sample behavior of each method. Although there is no single clear-cut winner, the Delayed Robbins-Monro (DRM) with maximum likelihood estimation and the Estimated Quantal Response Curve (Wu [21]) are shown to perform well over a broad variety of conditions.     

Multiperiod resource allocation with a smoothing objective

We consider a multiperiod resource allocation problem, where a single resource is allocated over a finite planning horizon of T periods. Resource allocated to one period can be used to satisfy demand of that period or of future periods, but backordering of demand is not allowed. The objective is to allocate the resource as smoothly as possible throughout the planning horizon. We present two models: the first assumes that the allocation decision variables are continuous, whereas the second considers only integer allocations. Applications for such models are found, for example, in subassembly production planning for complex products in a multistage production environment. Efficient algorithms are presented to find optimal allocations for these models at an effort of O(T²). Among all optimal policies for each model, these algorithms find the one that carries the least excess resources throughout the planning horizon. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

‘What is in a Name?’: The Role of (Different) Identities in the Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria

Abstract

Post-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present ‘battle for Syria’, a local conflict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are enthusiastic backers of sub-national identity.