THE PROHIBITION OF BLINDING AS A METHOD OF WARFARE

Abstract

From the 1982 Maitatsine Uprising to the 2009 Kala Kato Riot, Nigeria has been bedevilled by ethno-religious uprisings with devastating human and material losses. In almost all these crises the police and the military have featured prominently as agencies tasked with the responsibility of maintaining law and order and suppressing insurrection. While it was not alleged that they precipitated some of these risings perhaps in their attempts to stem or nip them in the bud, they have been accused of escalating the conflict either by their slow and inadequate responses, their partisanship and their arbitrary responses, or by their slackness in managing the crises and their aftermath. However, but for their efforts the security basis of the Nigerian state would have been considerably compromised by religious fundamentalism given the level of preparedness of the groups involved, their resistance and, more importantly, the recurrent nature of the uprisings. This article reflects on the management of ethno-religious uprisings in Nigeria by the police and the military. It considers the nature of the security agencies' involvement in the crises and examines the factors both within the agencies and in the larger Nigerian society which have aided or hindered their effective management of the conflicts.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Defence closure and job loss: The case of swan hunter on tyneside

Recently in this journal Hooper and Butler (1996) drew attention to the scale of job loss associated with restructuring in the defence sector in the aftermath of the Cold War. They noted that there is comparatively little knowledge of the experiences of workers following the closure of defence plants. This research communication attempts to shed further light on this issue by reporting the results of a survey of the experiences of former Swan Hunter shipyard workers who were made redundant after the firm went into receivership. The results confirm the complex but generally negative effect of redundancy on the workers involved.     

The inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in weaponry

Thomas Schelling argues that armed adversaries face an inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in their weaponry, geography and military organizations. Inherent propensity is the idea that there are characteristics embodied in the weapons that push adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the goals of the decision‐makers, the political disagreement between adversaries, and misperceptions about mutual resolve and hostility. We theoretically illustrate inherent propensity in conventional and nuclear arms settings using Lanchester and Intriligator war models. Our work extends the Intriligator‐Brito model, identifies when the competing Richardson and Intriligator‐Brito views of the relationship between arms races and war are correct, illustrates the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of alliances, and highlights the importance of arms quality control in the US‐USSR relationship.     

‘What Kind of War is This?’

This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.