EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

Review of the ordered and proportionate flow shop scheduling research

Ordered flow shop models have appeared in the literature since the mid‐1970s and proportionate flow shop models have appeared since the early 1980s. We provide a detailed review of these models along with some analysis and potential topics for future research. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation

The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents.     

France and the Gulf War of 1990–1991: Political‐military lessons learned

Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914–1918. Boston and London: Allen &; Unwin, 1985. Pp.x + 286; £20.00.

Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918–1922. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. Pp.viii + 200; £21.00.

Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy. London: Pan Books in association with Collins, 1984. Pp.xii + 555; £3.95.

R. J. Overy, Goering: The ‘Iron Man’, London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp. x + 310; bibliography; index; £14.95.

John Barron, KGB: The Hidden Hand. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983. Pp.489. $15.95.

Edward Van Der Rhoer, The Shadow Network: Espionage as an Instrument of Soviet Policy, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983. Pp.359. $19.95.

David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp (eds.), The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? London: Macmillan Press, 1984. Pp.290; £25.

A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. New York: Crane, Russak, 1982. Pp.xiii + 182; $19.50.

Condoleezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983: Uncertain Allegiance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp.xiv + 303; £40.40.

Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (Chatham House Papers, No. 24). London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul for RIIA, 1984. Pp.97; £4.95.

Phil Williams, US Troops in Europe (Chatham House Papers, No. 25). London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul for RIIA, 1984. Pp.87; £5.95.

Daniel Frei, Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1984. Pp.xiv + 321; NP.

Joseph Rotblat and Alessandro Pascolini (eds.), The Arms Race at a Time of Decision, Annals of Pugwash 1983. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984. Pp.xxiv + 291; £20 (hardback) and £7.95 (paperback).

Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xx + 215; £23.50.

Brian May, Russia, America, the Bomb and the Fall of Western Europe. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp.vii + 248. £11.95.

Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp.203; $19.95.     

Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940

The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper analyzes the use of information and intelligence of both sides at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Both sides performed poorly at the strategic level but the Germans proved far superior to the British at the operational and tactical levels. The paper challenges several common assumptions on the importance of intelligence and information in joint campaigns.