East versus West in the defeat of Nazi Germany

One of the most commonly expressed opinions about victory in the Second World War is that the Soviet Union was mostly responsible for beating Nazi Germany. Supposedly the great land war fought between these two powers in the East was the decisive front in Europe. The West's contribution to German defeat, on the other hand, is often seen as somewhat marginal. The Anglo‐American strategic bombing campaign in 1943 paid few dividends and it was not until after the Normandy landings in June 1944 that the West really began to divert a large amount of German resources.

The purpose of this article is to challenge some of these basic notions. Through analysing what Germany produced, where it was sent and how it was destroyed, the West's contribution to defeating Germany moves from an ancillary position to a dominant one. Taking German war production as a whole, from 1943 onwards the West was responsible for tying down and destroying a significantly larger share than the Soviet Union.     

Lanchester for cyber: The mixed epidemic‐combat model

Future conflict between armed forces will occur both in the physical domain as well as the information domain. The linkage of these domains is not yet fully understood. We study the dynamics of a force subject to kinetic effects as well as a specific network effect–spreading malware. In the course of our study, we unify two well‐studied models: the Lanchester model of armed conflict and deterministic models of epidemiology. We develop basic results, including a rule for determining when explicit modeling of network propagation is required. We then generalize the model to a force subdivided by both physical and network topology, and demonstrate the specific case where the force is divided between front‐ and rear‐echelons. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Urban gangs evolving as criminal Netwar actors

The nature of conflict and crime is changing. Technology allows groups to spread their influence without regard to geographic limitations. A shift from hierarchies to network organizational forms is also occurring. As a consequence non‐state actors can extend their influence to gain social, political or economic power and challenge state institutions. This article examines the potential for gangs, transnational criminals and terrorists to embrace network forms and utilize technology to wage netwar. Factors which influence ‘third generation’ gang organization (politicization, internationalization and sophistication) are described to illustrate how a net‐based threat can mature. A move toward network organization within transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups demonstrating the potential for these classic criminal entities to emerge as netwar actors is also reviewed. Finally, the need for state institutions such as the police and military to develop networked responses to combat networked threats is stated.     

MODELS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH: A CRITICAL REVIEW

This paper reviews some of the theoretical and econometric issues involved in estimating growth models that include military spending. While the mainstream growth literature has not found military expenditure to be a significant determinant of growth, much of the defence economics literature has found significant effects. The paper argues that this is largely the product of the particular specification, the Feder–Ram model, that has been used in the defence economics literature but not in the mainstream literature. The paper critically evaluates this model, detailing its problems and limitations and suggests that it should be avoided. It also critically evaluates two alternative theoretical approaches, the Augmented Solow and the Barro models, suggesting that they provide a more promising avenue for future research. It concludes with some general comments about modelling the links between military expenditure and growth.     

Quadratic bottleneck problems

We study the quadratic bottleneck problem (QBP) which generalizes several well‐studied optimization problems. A weak duality theorem is introduced along with a general purpose algorithm to solve QBP. An example is given which illustrates duality gap in the weak duality theorem. It is shown that the special case of QBP where feasible solutions are subsets of a finite set having the same cardinality is NP‐hard. Likewise the quadratic bottleneck spanning tree problem (QBST) is shown to be NP‐hard on a bipartite graph even if the cost function takes 0–1 values only. Two lower bounds for QBST are derived and compared. Efficient heuristic algorithms are presented for QBST along with computational results. When the cost function is decomposable, we show that QBP is solvable in polynomial time whenever an associated linear bottleneck problem can be solved in polynomial time. As a consequence, QBP with feasible solutions form spanning trees, s‐t paths, matchings, etc., of a graph are solvable in polynomial time with a decomposable cost function. We also show that QBP can be formulated as a quadratic minsum problem and establish some asymptotic results. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Turning gangsters into allies: the American way of war in Northern Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The American way of war in Afghanistan presents a conundrum for proponents of 21st-century state-building projects. How can liberal peace proponents engage in efficient state building without sacrificing their ideals? The US learned that state-building allocates a degree of command and control to powerbrokers operating in the shadows to launder aid money, traffic illicit narcotics, and engage in extrajudicial punishments. These clients failed to represent the liberal values foreign patrons endorsed, because the latter not only offered resources without conditions but also rewarded bad behavior. This issue is examined by looking at the case of post-2001 northern Afghanistan, where powerful warlords should have held greater control over their paramilitary forces, limited predatory behavior, and built stronger relationships with the community. Instead, warlords-turned-statesmen expanded their material and social influence in the north, while holding onto the informal instruments of racketeering and patronage that overwhelmed Western ideals and shaped the predatory state present in Afghanistan today. Moreover, paramilitaries were influenced by material, social, and normative incentives that rewarded violent and predatory behavior and further eroded already weak community control mechanisms at the subdistrict level.