The Hungarian method for the assignment problem

This paper has been presented with the Best Paper Award. It will appear in print in Volume 52, No. 1, February 2005.     

A platform for initial testing of multiple camouflage patterns

The human visual system is still an important factor in military warfare; military personnel receive training on effective search strategies, and camouflage that can effectively conceal objects and personnel is a key component of a successful integrated survivability strategy. Previous methods of camouflage assessment have, amongst others, used psychophysics to generate distinctiveness metrics. However, the population from which the human observers are drawn is often not well defined, or necessarily appropriate. In this experiment we designed a new platform for testing multiple patterns based on a camouflaged object detection task, and investigate whether trained military observers perform better than civilians. We use a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, with participants searching images of woodland for a replica military helmet displaying Olive Green, Multi Terrain Pattern, US Marine Pattern or, as a conspicuous control, UN Peacekeeper Blue. Our data show that there is no difference in detection performance between the two observer groups but that there are clear differences in the effectiveness of the different helmet colour patterns in a temperate woodland environment. We conclude that when tasks involve very short stimulus presentation times, task-specific training has little effect on the success of target detection and thus this paradigm is particularly suitable for robust estimates of camouflage efficacy.     

Concept costing for defence projects: the problem and its solution

It is intrinsic to the nature of military competition that the unit acquisition costs of defence systems rise generation by generation. Traditional “bottom‐up” methods of cost‐estimating cannot meet the increasing demands for extensive studies of many options before commencing design and, while “top‐down” estimating techniques are an improvement, in particular by reducing the time required for preparing estimates, they also are inadequate to meet current requirements. A new method has been devised, therefore, further developing “top‐down” methods using Bayesian techniques to make best use of the available information, whether certain or uncertain, and its accuracy established by example.     

Excess capacity in weapons production: An empirical analysis∗ †

This paper analyzes a set of observations by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on individual weapons systems regarding whether large amounts of excess capacity exist and whether short run average cost (SRAC) appears to be severely decreasing. It is shown that the amount of excess capacity and steepness of SRAC are essentially independent of output rate. It is then argued that this suggests that production is occurring in inefficiently large plants—i.e.—off the long run cost curve.     

What is Doctrine?

‘Doctrine’ has been part of military vernacular for at least a century. Nonetheless, it is a concept which is rather under-explored. The aim of this article is thus to break doctrine down into its component parts in order to grasp what a military doctrine actually is. Thereafter, the article points out different ways to utilise doctrine as a military devise. A doctrine cannot be, or rather should not be, all things to all men. On the contrary, doctrine can be a tool of command, tool of education or a tool of change. The main upshot of the article is that the future of doctrine is far brighter than its critics want us to believe.     

Churchill's naval holiday: Arms control and the Anglo‐German naval race, 1912–1914

Brian Johnson, The Secret War. London: BBC, 1978. Pp. 352; £6.50.

R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–45. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. xx + 556; £7.95.

Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 1904–46. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. 00 (Information not available from publisher); £8.50.

Adrian Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second War. London: Croom Helm, 1978. Pp. 138; £5.95.

W. G. F. Jackson. ’Overlord’: Normandy 1944. London: Davis Poynter, 1978. Pp. 250; £6.75.

Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. 292 + index + appendices; Np.

Gerard J. Mangone, Marine policy for America—The United States at Sea. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. Pp. 370, £17.50.

F. M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit. London: Leo Cooper, 1978. Pp. 189 + xv; £7.50.

Allen R. Millet, Ed., A Short History of the Vietnam War. London &; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. 169; £2.75.

Robert P. Berman, Soviet Airpower in Transition. Washington: Brookings, 1978. Pp. 82; $2.95 (Paper).     

The artful use of national power: Portuguese Angola (1961–1974)

In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances.