Workload distribution of discrete‐time parallel queues with two servers

We study discrete‐time, parallel queues with two identical servers. Customers arrive randomly at the system and join the queue with the shortest workload that is defined as the total service time required for the server to complete all the customers in the queue. The arrivals are assumed to follow a geometric distribution and the service times are assumed to have a general distribution. It is a no‐jockeying queue. The two‐dimensional state space is truncated into a banded array. The resulting modified queue is studied using the method of probability generating function (pgf) The workload distribution in steady state is obtained in form of pgf. A special case where the service time is a deterministic constant is further investigated. Numerical examples are illustrated. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 440–454, 2000     

Human conflict and universal ethics (part 2)

This second part of the review article begins with a definition of military power, when and how it should be used. From a large number of authors, “moral forces” are linked to “codes of conduct”, and the fundamental understandings about the “profession of arms”, based on “fiduciary trust”, “covenanted” service and professional and personal “conscience”. The article covers what authors have written about “culture” and the ethics of “technology” devices and systems, including “cyber” warfare. It concludes with recognition of the increase in ethical sensitivity in this century which is characterized by a phenomenon, the crises of “identity”, personal, national and global.     

EXPLORING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PROLIFERATORS

This theoretical analysis explores which countries might constitute the next generation of nuclear proliferators, using Venezuela as a case study of one of the possible next nuclear weapon states. Three alternative theoretical frameworks or models are used to analyze the preconditions that might or might not drive Venezuela to pursue nuclear weapons in the near future. This study finds that there is little evidence to support the alarmist claims surrounding a future Venezuelan nuclear weapons program. These findings are important for both devising an accurate US national security strategy for identifying and combating the next generation of proliferators and also for implementing effective policies for the future of US-Latin American relations.     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.     

Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943–1944

This article compares the philosophy and practice of command in the British and US Armies during the Italian Campaign of 1943–44. It assesses pre-war influences on the command approach adopted by each army, and shows how refinements derived from wartime experience enabled British and American commanders to successfully utilise mission command principles to outfight the German Army in the latter years of World War II. This examination directly challenges the historical consensus that Allied commanders were disadvantaged by an inability to exploit the advantages of mission command, and that the German Army retained superior command practices, despite its other failings, throughout the fighting between 1939 and 1945. These conclusions hold additional relevance to modern military organisations which have emphasised mission command as the optimal solution to effective command in battle since the 1980s, but from an inaccurate understanding of German, British and American command traditions and experience that persists to this day.