Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

Air Power in the Six-Day War

In the aftermath of Israel's stunning victory over Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces during the 1967 Six-Day War, accolades for the victory were often showered upon the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Indeed, many believed that it had been Israeli air power that had been the decisive element in the war by first eliminating the Arab air forces and then obliterating the Arab armies in turn. While the IAF did play an extremely important role in the fighting, it was not the decisive element of Israeli victory, and its impact was felt in very different ways from the common perception. Indeed, an appreciation of the true role of Israeli air power in the war reinforces both the importance of psychological factors in combat, and the ability of air forces to have a psychological impact disproportionate to their physical impact.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: An Emerging International Norm?

ABSTRACT

There have been calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons from the day they were invented. Over the last fifteen years, some indications can be found that such calls have been getting louder, among them Barack Obama's famous 2009 speech in Prague. In this article, we investigate if support for a comprehensive norm that would prohibit development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons is really growing. To assess the current status of that norm, we use the model of a “norm life cycle,” developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. We then analyze 6,545 diplomatic statements from the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as from the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, covering the years 2000 to 2013. The evidence shows that a comprehensive prohibition can be considered an emerging international norm that finds growing support among states without nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states alike. Only a core group of states invoke the norm consistently, however. This leads us to conclude that the “tipping point” of the life cycle, at which adherence to a new norm starts to spread rapidly, has yet to be reached.     

ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.     

Book review

This paper investigates the economic roots of separatist terrorism in Turkey. The political conventional wisdom is that poverty in highly Kurdish‐populated, south‐eastern Turkey is one of the most important causes of separatist terrorism and Turkish–Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Therefore, many economic policies have been implemented to improve the economic conditions in the south‐eastern part of the country. Using the Global Terrorism Database and Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology, I find that there is no causal relationship between economic conditions in south‐eastern Turkey and separatist terrorism. Therefore policy‐makers should be cautious in using economic measures to prevent separatist terrorism in Turkey.     

A stochastic assignment problem

There are n boxes with box i having a quota value Balls arrive sequentially, with each ball having a binary vector attached to it, with the interpretation being that if X_i = 1 then that ball is eligible to be put in box i. A ball's vector is revealed when it arrives and the ball can be put in any alive box for which it is eligible, where a box is said to be alive if it has not yet met its quota. Assuming that the components of a vector are independent, we are interested in the policy that minimizes, either stochastically or in expectation, the number of balls that need arrive until all boxes have met their quotas. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:23–31, 2015