Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in Turkey

This paper investigates the budgetary trade-off structure of security (defence+internal security) expenditures in Turkey for the period 1983-1998. A modified version of Todaro's distributive share index of social welfare is used to quantify the impacts on the growth of primary budget expenditures of Security, Education, Health, General Administration, Infrastructure, and Social Services. We find that defence expenditures dominate overall security expenditures and are less affected in times of bottlenecks in the economy. A systematic pattern of negative budgetary trade-offs of security expenditures in terms of other components is not identified. We also analyse the expenditures of the Defence Industry Support Fund in an attempt to find the cost of the modernisation program to the economy.     

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SECURITY POLICIES

This paper analyses public policy choices in the security economy from an economic perspective. It discusses the role of public goods for national and global security and identifies the importance of the first‐ and second‐order indirect effects of insecurity on economic activity, which include the behavioural responses of agents and the government to security measures, akin to such effects in insurance economics. Furthermore, key public policy trade‐offs are outlined, in particular between security and efficiency, globalisation, equity and freedom. The analysis identifies suitable policy options for raising security in the national and international contexts and in view of these trade‐offs. A balance between market and non‐market instruments in achieving security should be aimed for in order to minimise the adverse effects of aiming for higher security. In addition, the public good nature of security implies that international coordination of security policies is important, despite this process being fraught with enforcement problems.     

A LONG‐RUN ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE NATO COUNTRIES (1960–99)

This paper analyses the long‐run demand for defence output through a homogeneous treatment of 15 NATO member countries between 1960 and 1999. We carry out a progressive study of the interactions between either defence spending or defence burden and their main determinants: income, external threat and allied military spending. To that end, we use time‐series analysis with endogenously determined structural breaks. We further consider individual country functions related to one another through a common correlated effects method, in order to take into account explicitly the connections between members of an alliance.     

Political influence on civil war mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield

This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal.     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

The twin concepts of secrecy and transparency are central to any discourse on the freeness and fairness of elections, because they are universally accep ted yardsticks of the degree to which elections can be said to be legitimate. Without challenging this truism, this paper explores these concepts as both theoretical constructs and as manifes ted in empirical situations. It will highlight their ideological function and argue that they have an alienating effect in practice. The article will also attempt to show how secrecy and transparency have helped to shape Lesotho's electoral process and the mode of its management, and will also discuss the issues and questions that it raises. Next, the most critical issues in any debate concerning Lesotho's elections and their management are raised, followed by the recommendation of an ideal way of managing elections to serve the interest of voters better. Lastly, the paper demonstrates the danger of depoliticising elections and relegating them to the legal sphere, which only the courts of law are competent to interpret.