The United States and Latin America: Shaping an elusive future

This article presents a regional overview of US‐Latin American security relations, focusing on those countries where US national security interests are most likely to be endangered over the next two decades. The author examines the current US strategy of ‘shaping’ the Latin security environment, with a view to assessing the strength and weaknesses of this approach. The article presents some policy recommendations, including the recommendation that the US do more to redress the historical imbalance in Latin American civil‐military relations by strengthening civilian institutions. It also argues that at the regional level a major effort be made to recapture momentum toward the creation of a Free Trade Association of the Americas.     

Dynamic service rate control for a single‐server queue with Markov‐modulated arrivals

We consider the problem of service rate control of a single‐server queueing system with a finite‐state Markov‐modulated Poisson arrival process. We show that the optimal service rate is nondecreasing in the number of customers in the system; higher congestion levels warrant higher service rates. On the contrary, however, we show that the optimal service rate is not necessarily monotone in the current arrival rate. If the modulating process satisfies a stochastic monotonicity property, the monotonicity is recovered. We examine several heuristics and show where heuristics are reasonable substitutes for the optimal control. None of the heuristics perform well in all the regimes and the fluctuation rate of the modulating process plays an important role in deciding the right heuristic. Second, we discuss when the Markov‐modulated Poisson process with service rate control can act as a heuristic itself to approximate the control of a system with a periodic nonhomogeneous Poisson arrival process. Not only is the current model of interest in the control of Internet or mobile networks with bursty traffic, but it is also useful in providing a tractable alternative for the control of service centers with nonstationary arrival rates. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 661–677, 2013     

Robust shortest path problems with two uncertain multiplicative cost coefficients

We consider a robust shortest path problem when the cost coefficient is the product of two uncertain factors. We first show that the robust problem can be solved in polynomial time by a dual‐variable enumeration with shortest path problems as subproblems. We also propose a path enumeration approach using a K ‐shortest paths finding algorithm that may be efficient in many real cases. An application in hazardous materials transportation is discussed, and the solution methods are illustrated by numerical examples. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

‘Today we shall drink blood’: internal unrest in Nigeria

Despite some tentative internal peace agreements, Nigeria continues to face violence from multiple groups. This violence feeds upon itself, with segments of the population being mobilized both for self defense and for pressing their ideological and practical goals. These multiple sources of violence, which the Nigerian government appears unable to control to any significant degree, have a long term corrosive effect on the country's internal stability. There are few reasons to be sanguine as to any rapid changes to the level of overall violence or the relative number of armed groups, although their specific identities may shift. Nigeria represents a good case study of a country in which relatively low but persistent violence by a multiplicity of groups can have major impacts on internal security.     

Capacity and competence: full-spectrum counterinsurgency in the Horn of Africa

From 2006 to 2011, al Qaeda's East African proxy, al Shabaab, served as de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al Shabaab and the Burundian and Ugandan Peacekeepers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery, or development. Beginning in August 2011, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al Shabaab from Mogadishu, then subsequently, Kismayo, and ultimately to consolidate and reorganize in the Somali hinterland. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the newly recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG), neutralize al Shabaab, and provide good governance to its constituents. Al Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and their offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamic extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the Western Indian Ocean, destabilize East Africa, and adversely impact millions.