Algorithm to solve a chance‐constrained network capacity design problem with stochastic demands and finite support

We consider the problem of determining the capacity to assign to each arc in a given network, subject to uncertainty in the supply and/or demand of each node. This design problem underlies many real‐world applications, such as the design of power transmission and telecommunications networks. We first consider the case where a set of supply/demand scenarios are provided, and we must determine the minimum‐cost set of arc capacities such that a feasible flow exists for each scenario. We briefly review existing theoretical approaches to solving this problem and explore implementation strategies to reduce run times. With this as a foundation, our primary focus is on a chance‐constrained version of the problem in which α% of the scenarios must be feasible under the chosen capacity, where α is a user‐defined parameter and the specific scenarios to be satisfied are not predetermined. We describe an algorithm which utilizes a separation routine for identifying violated cut‐sets which can solve the problem to optimality, and we present computational results. We also present a novel greedy algorithm, our primary contribution, which can be used to solve for a high quality heuristic solution. We present computational analysis to evaluate the performance of our proposed approaches. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 236–246, 2016     

Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan

Decades of scholarship have warned against using historical analogies for policymaking. But the Taliban insurgency appears, on the surface, to confirm the usefulness of historical analogies to the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan. I review the use of analogies for the war in Afghanistan and argue the analogies were historically unsound and strategically unhelpful. In fact, their effect on policy helped create the conditions for the very insurgency policymakers most hoped to avoid. The Taliban insurgency did not occur because of the presence of too many foreign troops and aid workers, but because there were too few.     

The Changing Nature of Legitimate Authority in the Just War Tradition

ABSTRACT

The legitimate authority principle has become reduced to the issue of state authority. In its current formulation, the state has the sole authority to wage war, and because non-state actors, by their very definition, cannot satisfy this principle, their use of force is inherently unethical. This does not reflect the reality that non-state actors are increasingly engaging in the use of force, sometimes legitimately. As a result, the legitimate authority principle can and should look beyond the state. This article navigates a terrain in which non-state actors engage in the use of force, and in which revisionist just war thinking proposes that the concept of legitimate authority is irrelevant to thinking about the ethics of war. It proposes a principled approach to the inclusion of some non-state actors under the rubric of legitimate authority. This approach draws upon the historical development of the legitimate authority principle and incorporates the factors important to early writers on the subject.     

The snowball phenomenon: the US Marine Corps,military mythology and the spread of hybrid warfare theory

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the book by Ofer Fridman and seeks to situate the strategic debate on hybrid war in the context of debate on the US involvement in Iraq. It points to intellectuals from the Marine Corps having a significant role in the initial development of the hybrid warfare concept at a time of some reservation in US military circles over COIN strategy as this was set out in the field manual FM3-24. Thereafter, the hybrid war concept rapidly spread and became a conceptual device used to explain Russian strategic intentions in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014.     

Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018

ABSTRACT

Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.