The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War

After World War II, the US Navy confronted the challenge of adapting to dramatically altered geopolitical circumstances. Moscow did not have an ocean-going fleet, and early Cold War strategy was dominated by the salient position of nuclear strategic bombing – a mission thought to be outside the purview of the navy. Traditional roles, such as protecting sea lines of communication and supporting ground forces ashore, quickly proved indispensable. However, the navy eventually also succeeded in fielding dramatic technological and institutional innovations, for example, the strategic missile submarine, which enabled the US to successfully leverage maritime power against the continental power of the USSR.     

Proliferation and critical risk

Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers.

To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces.

Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike.     

The Iraq Survey Group: From Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counterinsurgency

The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 ¹The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Dept. of Defense, or the US Government. View all notes     

Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?

This chapter discusses the impact Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have on the security situation in Afghanistan, specifically in countering the terrorist threat and in counter-narcotics.

The Afghan people define the lack of security as their country's greatest problem. The terrorist activities of groups opposed to the central government and the political process compounded by violence related to the opium trade are seen as the main sources of insecurity. The authors argue that, currently, PRTs should not assume active counterterrorism as an additional main area of operation. The complexity of Afghanistan's security environment and the pressure to have PRTs involved in the counter-narcotics effort underscore the necessity of local knowledge and experience in the PRTs. Participation of indigenous actors, such as NGOs, in the PRT-organisational structure could provide this required expertise.     

Reviews

Ian Castle and Ian Knight, Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879. Greenhill Books, London 1994, Pp.256, 85 illus, 6 maps, index. £17.95. ISBN 1–85367–180–0.

Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Pp.263, selected biblio, index. $45/£30 (cloth); $14.95/£12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–691–03368 and 00068–9.

Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau (Research and Action) Ltd., 1992. Pp.212, 7 maps, photographs, glossary, sources/further reading, index. £17.99 ISBN 0–906156–70‐X and ‐71–8.

David A. Charters (ed.), Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1994. Pp.viii+220. NP.

Joachim Remak, A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. Pp.xvi+221, 6 map's, 68 illus, biblio, index. $24.95/£16.95.     

Webs of Smoke: Drugs and Small Wars

War and drugs share many characteristics – both are destructive of human life, highly profitable to some, and efforts to regulate them have failed. In fact, at various times throughout history, war and drugs have been intertwined, prolonging human suffering, bedeviling political leaders and enriching a select few. The pernicious role of drugs in organized political violence is often overlooked. Drugs have been the cause of war, the funding for military operations, used by combatants and a part of the post-war political landscape. The insidious nature of drugs is especially visible in a certain type of war – small wars – yet is virtually unexamined by scholars and decision-makers.