Book reviews

European Security in the New Political Environment by James H. Wyllie, London: Addison, Wesley Longman, 1997, ISBN 0-582-24403-X (pbk), £13.99

Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda edited by Vladimir Baranovsky, Oxford: Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 1997, ISBN 0-19-829201-5 (hbk), £45.00

The Defeat of Japan by David Rees, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, ISBN 0-275-95955-4 (hbk), £46.50

The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900-1940 by Nicholas Tracy (ed.), London: Ashgate, for the Navy Records Society, 1997, ISBN 1859-284-027 (hbk), £59.50

Knights in White Armour The New Art of War and Peace by Christopher Bellamy, London: Pimlico Press, 1997, ISBN 0-7126-739-03 (pbk), £12.50

Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World by avid A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds), University Park: Penn State Press, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01703-i (hbk), £49.50/$55, ISBN 0-271-01704-X (pbk), £7.95/$19.95

Contested Social Orders and International Politics by David Skidmore (ed.), Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-8265-1284-4 (hbk), $32.95

The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy by David H. Dunn. London: Macmillan Press, 1997, ISBN 0-333-67816-8 (hbk), £45.00

The Sociology of the Military by Guiseppe Caforio (ed.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998, ISBN 1-85898-619-2, 704 pp., £150

The Nordic Nations in the New Western Security Regime by Ingemar Dorfer, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-943875-83-8 (hbk), £27, ISBN 0-943875-82-X (pbk), £13     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

Mirror,mirror on the wall,who is the most offensive of them all? – Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.     

Cost analysis and extension of a simple maintenance-scheduling heuristic

Practitioners of maintenance scheduling sometimes use a simple analytic formula, derived based on inspection scheduling, as a heuristic to determine the length of the preventive maintenance period. The sensitivity of this heuristic solution is analyzed and the cost penalties are calculated compared to the exact solution that utilizes the lifetime distribution in the derivation of the optimal preventive maintenance period. A simple extension of the heuristic is suggested to improve the approximation with a slightly increased computational effort. The sensitivity and cost analysis of the improved heuristic are discussed as well. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The elephant in the room

When United States (US) President Barack Obama announced in 2013 that he would host the first United States-Africa leaders' summit the next year, he was greeted with considerable scepticism. Many critics thought he was just playing catch-up with other countries and organisations which had been holding Africa summits for years, especially China. But, whatever the motives, the event itself proved to be a substantial success, probably re-setting US relations with Africa for many years to come.     

RAIN,GROWTH, AND CIVIL WAR: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION

We re‐examine the Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) study of the impact of growth on civil war, using growth in rainfall as an instrument. Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) – in our view, erroneously – include countries participating in civil wars in other states. Restricting the conflict data to states with conflict on their own territory reduces the estimated impact of economic growth on civil war. We show how spatial correlations in rainfall growth and participation in civil conflicts induce a stronger apparent relationship in the mis‐classified data.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.