Aggregating assignment constraints

This article shows how simple systems of linear equations with {0,1} variables can be aggregated into a single linear equation whose {0,1} solutions are identical to the solutions of the original system. Structures of the original systems are exploited to keep the aggregator's integer coefficients from becoming unnecessarily large. The results have potential application in integer programming and information theory, especially for problems that contain assignment-type constraints along with other constraints. Several unresolved questions of a number-theoretic nature are mentioned at the conclusion of the article.     

Time-minimizing transportation problems

A method is given for finding those solutions of a transportation problem which minimize the total time necessary for transporting goods from the suppliers to the consumers. Several extensions of the model are presented.     

Book Reviews

Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903–1939. By J. P. Harris, Manchester University Press, (1995) ISBN 0 7190 3762 (hardback) £40.00 or ISBN 0 7190 4814 (paperback) £14.99

Fighting for Ireland. By M. L. R. Smith. London and New York: Routledge, (1995) ISBN 0–415–09161–6.

The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) HMSO London (1995) ISBN 0–11–772470‐X £9.50

Regional Conflicts: The Challenges to US‐Russian Co‐Operation Edited by James E. Goodby SIPRI: Oxford University Press 1995 ISBN 019‐S29–171X, £30.00

SIPRI Yearbook 1995 ‐ Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995. ISBN 019–829–1930, £60.00.

Drug Trafficking in the Americas Edited by Bruce M. Bagley & William O. Walker III Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, (USA), 1994 ISBN 1–56000–752–4.

Raglan: From the Peninsula to the Crimea By John Sweetman, Arms & Armour 1993. ISBN 1–85409–059–3. £19.00.     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Situations and Dispositions: How to Rescue the Military Virtues from Social Psychology

In recent years, it has been argued more than once that situations determine our conduct to a much greater extent than our character does. This argument rests on the findings of social psychologists such as Stanley Milgram, who have popularized the idea that we can all be brought to harm innocent others. An increasing number of philosophers and ethicists make use of such findings, and some of them have argued that this so-called situationist challenge fatally undermines virtue ethics. As virtue ethics is currently the most popular underpinning for ethics education in the military, it is important to know to what extent the claim situationists make is correct. Fortunately, a closer look indicates that an interactionist perspective, with our character and the situation interplaying, is more accurate than the situationist perspective.     

Terrorist choice: a stochastic dominance and prospect theory analysis

The paper explores terrorist choice by applying two well-known theoretical frameworks: stochastic dominance and prospect theory (PT). We analyse each pair of attack methods that can be formed from the RAND-MIPT database and the Global Terrorism Database. Instances of stochastic dominance are identified. PT orderings are computed. Attention is accorded to the identification of ‘trigger points’ and the circumstances that may lead to an increased likelihood that a terrorist will select an attack method associated with a higher expected number of fatalities, i.e. a potentially more damaging attack method.     

An engagement model to optimize defense against a multiple attack assuming perfect kill assessment

We present an air-defense engagement model to counter an attack by multiple antiship missiles, assuming perfect kill assessment. In this model, the probability of shooting down all incoming missiles is maximized. A generating function is employed to produce an algorithm which is used to evaluate the outcomes. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 687–697, 1997