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Peter Sandholt Jensen 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):359-372
We re‐examine the Miguel et al. (2004) study of the impact of growth on civil war, using growth in rainfall as an instrument. Miguel et al. (2004) – in our view, erroneously – include countries participating in civil wars in other states. Restricting the conflict data to states with conflict on their own territory reduces the estimated impact of economic growth on civil war. We show how spatial correlations in rainfall growth and participation in civil conflicts induce a stronger apparent relationship in the mis‐classified data. 相似文献
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B. Peter Rosendorff 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5-6):443-457
This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile. 相似文献
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Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion. 相似文献
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Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Dr Peter R. Neumann 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):571-595
This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power. 相似文献
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Command and Control (C2) in a military setting can be epitomized in battles‐of‐old when commanders would seek high ground to gain superior spatial‐temporal information; from this vantage point, decisions were made and relayed to units in the field. Although the fundamentals remain, technology has changed the practice of C2; for example, enemy units may be observed remotely, with instruments of varying positional accuracy. A basic problem in C2 is the ability to track an enemy object in the battlespace and to forecast its future position; the (extended) Kalman filter provides a straightforward solution. The problem changes fundamentally if one assumes that the moving object is headed for an (unknown) location, or waypoint. This article is concerned with the new problem of estimation of such a waypoint, for which we use Bayesian statistical prediction. The computational burden is greater than an ad hoc regression‐based estimate, which we also develop, but the Bayesian approach has a big advantage in that it yields both a predictor and a measure of its variability. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004 相似文献