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Antoon W.J. Kolen Jan Karel Lenstra Christos H. Papadimitriou Frits C.R. Spieksma 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(5):530-543
In interval scheduling, not only the processing times of the jobs but also their starting times are given. This article surveys the area of interval scheduling and presents proofs of results that have been known within the community for some time. We first review the complexity and approximability of different variants of interval scheduling problems. Next, we motivate the relevance of interval scheduling problems by providing an overview of applications that have appeared in literature. Finally, we focus on algorithmic results for two important variants of interval scheduling problems. In one variant we deal with nonidentical machines: instead of each machine being continuously available, there is a given interval for each machine in which it is available. In another variant, the machines are continuously available but they are ordered, and each job has a given “maximal” machine on which it can be processed. We investigate the complexity of these problems and describe algorithms for their solution. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
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Defence offsets are elements of defence procurement deals additional to the primary content. Offsets are usually expected to yield technological or industrial benefits to the purchasing country (e.g. countertrade, technology transfers, or additional jobs) and military buyers often require suppliers to make offsets available “cost-free.” The authors argued previously that such strategies achieve little of value to buyers that lack market power and are unnecessary otherwise, since purchasers with the market power to extract more value for money from foreign suppliers can do so anyway. This article also focuses on the supply side of offset deals. The USA is the world's largest defence offsets supplier but the US government opposes offsets demands as economically inefficient and trade distorting. Even if offsets are inefficient and trade distorting, they may still benefit a materiel-exporting country such as the USA as they may induce exports and create associated benefits for the offsets provider. 相似文献
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Modeling R&D as standard sequential search, we consider a monopolist who can implement a sequence of technological discoveries during the technology search process: he earns revenue on his installed technology while he engages in R&D to find improved technology. What is not standard is that he has a finite number of opportunities to introduce improved technology. We show that his optimal policy is characterized by thresholds ξi(x): introduce the newly found technology if and only if it exceeds ξi(x) when x is the state of the currently installed technology and i is the number of remaining introductions allowed. We also analyze a nonstationary learning‐by‐doing model in which the monopolist's experience in implementing new technologies imparts increased capability in generating new technologies. Because this nonstationary model is not in the class of monotone stopping problems, a number of surprising results hold and several seemingly obvious properties of the stationary model no longer hold. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011 相似文献
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We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs, when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well‐informed attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the queues to make the system resilient to worst‐case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three‐level sequential game of perfect information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero‐one random‐outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011 相似文献