Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers,old Strategies

The US-led ‘war on terror’ dramatically changed America's security strategy towards Africa. But more fundamentally, it threw the Horn of Africa on the centre stage of global counter-terrorism. A double-edged blade, counter-terrorism has at once catalysed peace processes and intensified insecurity, with Islamic radicalism at the core of the regional storm. Governments utilised the threat of terrorism for political ends, defending old security paradigms that prioritised regime stability over human security. Africa integrated counter-terrorism into its emerging security agenda, but insufficient funds, operational constraints and poor coordination with international initiatives have hampered meaningful progress. Washington, laudably, launched a robust counter-terrorist campaign, but its high-handed military-heavy style put fragile democracies at risk while lapses in its overall policy risk triggering proxy wars. This essay examines the impact of counter-terrorism on security in the Horn of Africa. It argues for stronger coordination between national, regional and international initiatives to curb international terrorism.     

WHY IRAN WANTS THE BOMB AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US POLICY

Understanding why the Iranian regime wants to possess nuclear weapons is essential to formulating the best policy to prevent (or perhaps to simply manage) the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Three general theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide a framework for looking at Iran's nuclear motivations. However, contrary to many analyses, the regime's desire to possess nuclear arms stems not from neorealist defensive concerns, but rather from offensive goals driven by domestic politics. The use of extremist Islamism by the Iranian regime to justify its autocratic rule is the primary motivating factor. Accordingly, the outlook for diplomatically addressing the Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations appears dim.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.     

IF YOU WANT IT DONE RIGHT,DO IT YOURSELF

Some have argued that the transatlantic rancor over the Iraq war made cooperation, especially on nonproliferation, unlikely. In contrast, this article, documents post-invasion instances of nonproliferation cooperation, with particular emphasis on the Proliferation Security Initiative and the EU-3 Initiative—the British, French, and German negotiations with Iran over its suspected nuclear activities. In addition to documenting French and British participation in these initiatives, the article analyzes why they have chosen to participate and argues that France and Britain have participated in both efforts because they are committed to avoiding future Iraq-like preventive wars.     

Portfolio analysis for defense: taking account of networking

To manage their assets at an enterprise level, defense organizations have turned to portfolio theory for the planning, analysis and management of their military forces and materiel. Despite being well established in the commercial sector, the application of portfolio approaches in defense is problematic. The vexatious question for defense of how to define and measure benefits arising is complicated by the increased utility and effectiveness achieved through networking of military forces and the equipment they use. The authors discuss the challenges for defense in using a portfolio approach and propose a conceptual model for dealing with the effects arising from networking with information and communications technologies.