Book reviews

Use of Force: The Practise of States by A. Mark Weisburd, Penn: Penn State Press, University Park, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01679-5 (hbk), $65.00/£58.00, ISBN 0-271-01680-9 (pbk), $25.00/£22.50

Late Breaking Foreign Policy: the News Media's Influence on Peace Operations by Warren P. Strobel, Washington DC: United States Insititute of Peace Press, 1997, ISBN 1-878379-68-2 (hbk), £23.25, ISBN 1-878379-67-4 (pbk)

The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War by Richard N. Haass, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, 148pp, index, ISBN 0-87609-201-6 (hbk), $24.95

The UN, Peace and Force edited by Michael Pugh, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146-4795-4 (hbk), £29.50, ISBN 0-7146-4320-3 (pbk), £15.00

Confidence-Building in South East Asia by Malcolm Chalmers, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, ISBN 1-85143-116-0 (pbk), £19.95

Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident by Robert H. Paterson, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146470-3 (hbk), £35.00, ISBN 0-7146-4297-5 (pbk) £18.00

OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War by Maochun Yu, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0 300 06698-8 (hbk), £25.00

Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy by Michael S. Lund, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996, ISBN 1-878379-52-6 (pbk), £11.75     

A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, in which negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approach can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.     

The FARC’s militaristic blueprint

This article intends to explain the outstanding sequence of success and failure exhibited by the FARC, the main Colombian guerrilla since the 1980s. It claims that such sequence is unintelligible unless the adoption by the FARC of a militaristic organizational blueprint at its 1982 7^th Conference is taken into account. By building itself like an army, the FARC could boost its combat capacity, maintain its structural integrity, and develop powerful mechanisms that held the whole structure together. At the same time, the militarization of the FARC also entailed significant risks and costs like political isolation and high personnel turnover. After describing the militaristic blueprint, the article compares the FARC with other irregular forces that operated in the Colombian context – a comparison which is important to understand the specificity of the FARC trajectory, as well as the benefits and costs involved in it. The analysis highlights the critical role of organizational dimensions in the explanation of civil war outcomes, and suggests that at least for some problems organizational dynamics should be observed at a low level of granularity.     

Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.     

Sweden and the issue of NATO membership: exploring a public opinion paradox

The past decade has seen substantial shifts in Swedish security policy and major change in the domestic debate about NATO. For the first time, all of the right-of-centre “alliance parties” are calling for a full NATO membership, and popular support for NATO has increased. Yet public opinion contains ambiguities and paradoxes that complicate the picture. At the same time as support for NATO has increased, the public is overwhelmingly for continued military non-alignment. Drawing on previous research, longitudinal data from national surveys, and other sources on defence and security issues, this article aims to increase our understanding of the development and change in Swedish public opinion on NATO. A key argument is that Erving Goffman’s theatre metaphor, combined with neo-institutional decoupling theory, to a large degree can help understand the public opinion paradox.     

Mirror,mirror on the wall,who is the most offensive of them all? – Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.     

The effectiveness of the longest delivery time rule for the flow shop delivery time problem

In the flow shop delivery time problem, a set of jobs has to be processed on m machines. Every machine has to process each one of the jobs, and every job has the same routing through the machines. The objective is to determine a sequence of the jobs on the machines so as to minimize maximum delivery completion time over all the jobs, where the delivery completion time of a job is the sum of its completion time, and the delivery time associated with that job. In this paper, we prove the asymptotic optimality of the Longest Delivery Time algorithm for the static version of this problem, and the Longest Delivery Time among Available Jobs (LDTA) algorithm for the dynamic version of this problem. In addition, we present the result of computational testing of the effectiveness of these algorithms. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Environmental regulation in project‐based industries

We study the environmental regulation of industrial activities that are organized as projects. Applications arise in construction, ship and aircraft building, and film making, among other industries. Relative to manufacturing, environmental regulation is different in project‐based industries, due to the uniqueness and geographical diversity of projects, and a lack of product takeback programs. Because the amount of waste and pollution generated by project companies can be large, regulators need environmental policies to ensure reduction of waste and pollution. We consider a regulator who attempts to maximize social welfare. We model this problem as a bilevel nonlinear program. The upper level regulator specifies waste reduction targets, which the lower level project companies meet using waste stream reduction and remediation of pollution, while attempting to control their project costs. We find that high waste diversion targets lead to outcomes with little pollution, but excessive project costs and only modest waste stream reduction. Projects that have lower task precedence density, or that have pollutants with different environmental impacts, show larger increases in project cost and time resulting from regulation. We describe a subsidy for waste stream reduction that coordinates the system, and we estimate the value of coordination. We also describe a bonus that encourages truthful reporting by project companies, and evaluate the relative cost and effectiveness of the subsidy and the bonus. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 228–247, 2015     

Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats

This article explores how the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats. I draw on practice approaches to analyze what social groups are doing when they claim to “protect civilians.” I show how innovative protection mechanisms can be seen as a function of officials and diplomats coping with the changing circumstances of increasingly militarized politics in Africa. Specifically, accountability mechanisms for unintended and intended civilian harm by African security operations have originated in connection with this development. I argue that these are results of anchoring practices, which means that everyday informal interactions in one context become linked to another context. I argue that these emerging accountability mechanisms represent a new combination of practices, with the potential of changing the routine activities and mutual learning between policymakers and diplomats.