A characterization of optimal base‐stock levels for a multistage serial supply chain

In this article, we present a multistage model to optimize inventory control decisions under stochastic demand and continuous review. We first formulate the general problem for continuous stages and use a decomposition solution approach: since it is never optimal to let orders cross, the general problem can be broken into a set of single‐unit subproblems that can be solved in a sequential fashion. These subproblems are optimal control problems for which a differential equation must be solved. This can be done easily by recursively identifying coefficients and performing a line search. The methodology is then extended to a discrete number of stages and allows us to compute the optimal solution in an efficient manner, with a competitive complexity. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 32–46, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT

China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.     

Nonlinear pricing with consumer satiation

In various scenarios, consumers may become satiated with products, and the degree of satiation is directly associated with their prior experiences. Confronted with consumer satiation, the seller is unable to either identify consumers who have a higher likelihood of being satiated ex ante or distinguish satiated from non‐satiated consumers ex post. Therefore, the seller should address dynamic selling, valuation uncertainty, and quantity decisions, all of which are important operational issues. We consider a two‐period problem in which consumer types are influenced by their prior consumption experiences. Faced with these consumers, the seller intends to optimize quantities and adjust the prices of the products in each period to maximize revenue. We find that the seller may reduce ex ante production quantity as some consumers become satiated. Moreover, the ex ante quantity is first decreasing and then increasing with regard to the satiation rate. Furthermore, two‐period information asymmetries may provide a rationale for upward distortion in quantity when consumer preferences are highly sensitive to first‐period consumption. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 386–400, 2016     

An exact method for finding shortest routes on a sphere,avoiding obstacles

On the surface of a sphere, we take as inputs two points, neither of them contained in any of a number of spherical polygon obstacles, and quickly find the shortest route connecting these two points while avoiding any obstacle. The WetRoute method presented here has been adopted by the US Navy for several applications. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 374–385, 2016     

周恩来建设人民海军的理论和实践

周恩来协助毛泽东开创了中国人民海军事业。他高瞻远瞩,为人民海军的创建发展做好顶层设计;他呕心沥血,制定新中国海军建设的战略规划;他事必躬亲,操劳着海军建设方方面面的具体事项;他英明善断,指挥部署人民海军重要战役和重大行动。他对创建和发展年轻的共和国海军,作出了不可磨灭的贡献。周恩来建设人民海军的理论和实践,对今天的海军建设仍具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。     

Collaborative procurement among competing buyers

Collaborative procurement emerged as one of the many initiatives for achieving improved inter‐firm coordination and collaboration. In this article, we adopt a game‐theoretical approach to study the interaction between two firms who procure jointly, but produce independently and remain competitors in a product market characterized by price‐sensitive demand. We study the underlying economics behind collaborative procurement, examine the effects of collaboration on buyer and supplier profitability, and derive conditions under which collaboration is beneficial to each participant. We find that a necessary and sufficient condition for a buyer to collaborate is to increase its sales. We identify the conditions that lead equal size buyers (i.e., consortia consisting of only large buyers or only small buyers) versus different size buyers to collaborate. We also determine the conditions that make collaboration profitable for the supplier, and show that rather than selling a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier prefers to sell to multiple buyers in smaller quantities. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling parallel machines with inclusive processing set restrictions

We consider the problem of assigning a set of jobs to different parallel machines of the same processing speed, where each job is compatible to only a subset of those machines. The machines can be linearly ordered such that a higher‐indexed machine can process all those jobs that a lower‐indexed machine can process. The objective is to minimize the makespan of the schedule. This problem is motivated by industrial applications such as cargo handling by cranes with nonidentical weight capacities, computer processor scheduling with memory constraints, and grades of service provision by parallel servers. We develop an efficient algorithm for this problem with a worst‐case performance ratio of + ε, where ε is a positive constant which may be set arbitrarily close to zero. We also present a polynomial time approximation scheme for this problem, which answers an open question in the literature. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010